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COMMENT
Variations in the Marketable-Product Rule from State to
State
I. Introduction
Disputes pertaining to the proper calculation of gas royalty payments have
led to much litigation and diverse case law.  Many of these disputes concern
the point at which the price of gas is valued for royalty payment purposes.  The
point at which royalty valuation occurs involves a determination of how the
gas is valued and whether certain post-extraction costs may be deducted.   This1
article focuses on the second factor, the allocation of post-extraction costs.
Post-extraction costs are those incurred after gas is extracted from the
wellhead.   The deductibility of post-extraction costs from a lessor’s royalty2
payment is a state specific and instrument-specific inquiry.  This inquiry
requires consideration of a state’s particular treatment of the “at the well”
phrase, as well as the extent of the lessee’s duties under the implied covenant
to market.  
The issue of post-extraction deductions has led to multiple class-action
lawsuits filed by disgruntled lessors claiming that their royalties were
underpaid due to the lessee’s improper deduction of costs.   Furthermore, these3
lawsuits will continue because of uncertainties and variations in the courts’
treatment of post-extraction costs and “at the well” terminology in royalty
provisions.  In addition, a state’s rule regarding post-extraction costs affects
the drafting of royalty provisions in oil and gas leases, because parties may
contract around a state’s default rule on the allocation of post-extraction costs.  4
1. 3 EUGENE KUNTZ, LAW OF OIL & GAS §§ 40.4(d), 42.2 (1989) (determination of market
value for purposes of paying gas royalty); id. § 40.4(3) (determination of proceeds deductions);
see also Martin v. Glass, 571 F. Supp. 1406, 1410 (N.D. Tex. 1983), aff’d, 736 F.2d 1524 (5th
Cir. 1984); Scott Lansdown, The Marketable Condition Rule, 44 S. TEX. L. REV. 667, 670
(2003). 
2. KUNTZ, supra note 1, § 40.5; see also Owen L. Anderson, Royalty Valuation: Should
Royalty Obligations Be Determined Intrinsically, Theoretically, or Realistically? (pt. 2), 37
NAT. RESOURCES J. 611, 627 (1997) (quoting Piney Woods Country Life Sch. v. Shell Oil Co.,
726 F.2d 225, 240 (5th Cir. 1984)). 
3. See Rogers v. Westerman Farm Co., 29 P.3d 887 (Colo. 2001); Sternberger v. Marathon
Oil Co., 894 P.2d 788 (Kan. 1995); Mittelstaedt v. Santa Fe Minerals, Inc., 1998 OK 7, 954
P.2d 1203; Estate of Tawney v. Columbia Natural Res., L.L.C., 633 S.E.2d 22 (W. Va. 2006).
4. See Garman v. Conoco, Inc., 886 P.2d 652, 657 (Colo. 1994); Martin, 571 F. Supp. at
1410.
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In many states, however, it remains unclear what language the courts will
deem sufficient to allocate these costs.   5
Two general rules address post-extraction deductions: the at-the-well rule
and the marketable-product rule.   In states adhering to the at-the-well rule, all6
post-extraction costs may be deducted.   Conversely, in states adhering to the7
marketable-product rule, the deductibility of particular post-extraction costs
is unclear and varies somewhat from state to state.   At least two states that8
adhere to the marketable-product rule have modified the general approach
beyond the view of treatise writers.   This has resulted in a wide spectrum of9
marketable-product rules, with differing results as to the deductibility of post-
extraction costs under each specific state’s rule.  Rather than critique and
criticize the various rules, as so many have already done,  this article seeks to10
shine some light on the uncertainties of the marketable-product rule.
The purpose of this comment is to compare the case law in states that adhere
to the marketable-product rule, and to analyze how these states differ in their
specific application of the rule.  Part II provides an overview of the law
applicable to royalties, royalty clause language, and post-extraction costs.  Part
III examines the case law of five states adhering to some version of the
marketable-product rule.  Part IV compares and contrasts these five state
variations of the marketable-product rule, as well as discussing some of the
problems inherent in the rules.  This comment concludes in Part V. 
5. See, e.g., Heritage Res., Inc. v. NationsBank, 939 S.W.2d 118 (Tex. 1996) (holding that
an “at the well” phrase trumped an express no-deductions clause); Tawney, 633 S.E.2d 22
(holding that an “at the well” phrase was insufficient to allocate post-extraction costs). 
6. See Owen L. Anderson, Royalty Valuation: Calculating Freight in a Marketable-
Product Jurisdiction, 20 ENERGY & MINERAL L. INST. 331, 338 (2000); Adam Marshall, Note,
Oil & Gas Law: Royalty Valuation: Rogers v. Westerman Farm Co.: Burdening Lessees with
an Implied Duty to Deliver Gas to a Marketable Location, 56 OKLA. L. REV. 233, 235 (2003).
7. See Piney Woods, 726 F.2d 225; Martin, 571 F. Supp. at 1412; Schroeder v. Terra
Energy, Ltd., 565 N.W.2d 887 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997); Heritage Res., 939 S.W.2d 118. 
8. See Owen L. Anderson, Royalty Valuation: Should Overriding Royalty Interests and
Nonparticipating Royalty Interests, Whether Payable in Value or in Kind, Be Subject to the
Same Valuation Standard as Lease Royalty?, 35 LAND & WATER L. REV. 1, 3 (2000); see also
Rogers, 29 P.3d 887; Sternberger, 894 P.2d 788; Mittelstaedt, 1998 OK 7, 954 P.2d 1203;
Tawney, 633 S.E.2d 22.
9. See Rogers, 29 P.3d 887; Tawney, 633 S.E.2d 22. 
10. See, e.g., Byron C. Keeling & Karolyn King Gillespie, The First Marketable Product
Doctrine: Just What Is the “Product”?, 37 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1, 21 (2005); David Pierce,
Developments in Nonregulatory Oil and Gas Law: The Continuing Search for Analytical
Foundations, 47 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX’N, 1-1, 1-43 to -48 (1996); Edward B. Poitevent,
II, Post-Production Deductions from Royalty, 44 S. TEX. L. REV. 709, 714 (2003). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol60/iss4/4
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II. The Royalty, Royalty Clause Language, and the Rules Regarding Post-
Extraction Cost
A. Royalty Valuation Basics
A royalty is created when a mineral owner leases her oil and gas rights
retaining a risk-free, noncost bearing interest in oil and gas produced and
saved from the leased property.   A royalty is usually the primary11
consideration, or benefit, received by a lessor in exchange for granting a
lease.   Generally, royalty provisions are construed as being free of all costs12
incurred in bringing about “production” of oil and gas  and are payable either13
“in kind” or “in cash.”   If a royalty clause states that the royalty owner is to14
be paid in either oil or gas, the royalty is “in kind,” and entitles the royalty
owner to receive his proportionate share of the mineral produced.   If the15
royalty clause states that the royalty owner is to be paid a sum of money, the
royalty is “in cash,” and entitles the royalty owner to receive a sum of money
which is usually related to the value of the gas.   Typically, royalty clauses16
have separate provisions for oil and gas.   Oil is often payable “in kind”  and17 18
gas is almost always payable “in cash.”   This different treatment results from19
the physical differences between the two products.  Oil, being a liquid, can be
separated at the well site and the royalty owner can physically receive her
share.   Gas is more effectively marketed in bulk, and royalty owners cannot20
easily take their share at the well site.   Even if the royalty clause calls for the21
royalty to be paid “in kind,” the royalty owner often waives the right to
delivery “in kind” and receives payments in cash.   When a royalty is payable22
11. 1 HOWARD R. WILLIAMS & CHARLES J. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 301 (2007).
12. Keeling & Gillespie, supra note 10, at 21. 
13. 58 C.J.S. Mines and Minerals § 298 (2007); see also KUNTZ, supra note 1, § 40.5, at
351 (“Unquestionably, under most leases, the lessee must bear all costs of production.”). 
14. See KUNTZ, supra note 1, § 38.2.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. JOHN S. LOWE ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON OIL AND GAS LAW 231 (John S. Lowe
& Pauline M. Simmons eds., 4th ed. 2002); see also Keeling & Gillespie, supra note 10, at 9;
Jefferson D. Stewart & David F. Maron, Post-Production Charges to Royalty Interests: What
Does the Contract Say and When Is It Ignored?, 70 MISS. L.J. 625, 628 (2000). 
18. LOWE ET AL., supra note 17, at 231; see also KUNTZ, supra note 1, § 39.2. 
19. LOWE ET AL., supra note 17, at 231; see also KUNTZ, supra note 1, § 40.4(a); Poitevent,
supra note 10, at 716. 
20. LOWE ET AL., supra note 17, at 231; see also Poitevent, supra note 10, at 716. 
21. LOWE ET AL., supra note 17, at 231.
22. KUNTZ, supra note 1, §§ 39.2(c), 40.3(c).
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“in cash,” the royalty-valuation point must be ascertained for purposes of
calculating royalty.   23
The royalty-valuation point refers to the point at which the value of oil or
gas is fixed for the purpose of calculating a lessor’s royalty payment.   The24
point at which royalty valuation occurs involves a determination of the
amount, as established by the lease, on which royalty is to be paid, as well as
the deductions that may be taken.   The amount of royalty payable usually25
depends first on whether the lease requires royalty to be paid on proceeds or
on an implicit market value of the product.   This is determined by the26
language of the royalty clause.   Courts’ interpretation of the language,27
however, varies from state to state.28
The next step involves the determination of what deductions, if any, may be
taken from the amount on which royalty is to be paid.   The deductions29
allowed depend on a specific state’s rule regarding post-extraction costs.   For30
example, in a “proceeds at the well” lease, if a lessee is allowed to deduct
transportation costs to a distant market, then royalty is paid on the proceeds
received for the sale of gas, less deductions for the costs incurred in
transporting the gas to the point of sale.   Thus, the royalty-valuation point is31
the price of the gas before it was transported, and to determine this price the
transportation costs are deducted from the proceeds.  
Courts differ on whether the lessee can deduct post-extraction costs from
the lessor’s royalty payment.   Post-extraction costs are the costs incurred32
23. See Martin v. Glass, 571 F. Supp. 1406, 1410 (N.D. Tex. 1983), aff’d, 736 F.2d 1524
(5th Cir. 1984); Lansdown, supra note 1, at 670.
24. See Martin, 571 F. Supp. at 1410; Lansdown, supra note 1, at 670.
25. See Martin, 571 F. Supp. at 1410; Lansdown, supra note 1, at 670.
26. KUNTZ, supra note 1, § 40.4(d) & (e). 
27. Id. § 39.3(c); see also Piney Woods Country Life Sch. v. Shell Oil Co., 726 F.2d 225,
233-38 (5th Cir. 1984) (distinguishing “market value” from “proceeds”).
28. See, e.g., Piney Woods, 726 F.2d at 233-38 (distinguishing “market value” from
“proceeds”); Roye Realty & Developing, Inc. v. Watson, 1996 OK 93, 949 P.2d 1208; Tex. Oil
& Gas Corp. v. Vela, 429 S.W.2d 886 (Tex. 1968); see also Anderson, supra note 2, at 614;
Bruce M. Kramer, Interpreting the Royalty Obligation by Looking at the Express Language:
What a Novel Idea?, 35 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 223, 241-52 (2004). 
29. See Keeling & Gillespie, supra note 10, at 32-37; Lansdown, supra note 1, at 669. 
30. It is important to note that the phrase “deductions from a lessor’s royalty payment”
actually means deductions from the amount on which a lessor’s royalty payment is based.  The
lessor is not charged, and does not owe anything when deductions are taken.  Instead, the
lessor’s royalty payment is based on a lower amount, resulting in a lower royalty payment.  See
Lansdown, supra note 1, at 670; Poitevent, supra note 10, at 714. 
31. See Johnson v. Jernigan, 1970 OK 180, 475 P.2d 396 (ruling that in Oklahoma, costs
of transporting oil or gas to distant market can be deducted from royalty).
32. See Rogers v. Westerman Farm Co., 29 P.3d 887 (Colo. 2001); Sternberger v. Marathon
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol60/iss4/4
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after oil or gas is extracted from the wellhead.   These costs include gathering,33
transportation, compression, dehydration, separation, blending, treating, and
processing.   Processing involves the extraction of natural gas liquids (NGLs),34
but the term processing is often more generally used by courts to describe
various post-extraction operations.   When construing royalty clauses, the35
courts generally agree that extraction costs cannot be deducted when a lessee
determines the royalty payable to a lessor; however, they do not agree on
whether the various kinds of post-extraction costs are deductible.   The post-36
extraction-costs dispute often concerns the lessee’s duties pursuant to the
implied covenant to market as well as the sufficiency of “at the well”
terminology contained in a lease royalty clause.   Unfortunately, current case37
law regarding post-extraction costs, the implied covenant to market, and the
interpretation of “at the well” varies from state to state. 
B. The Two Approaches to Post-Extraction Costs: The At-the-Well Rule and
the Marketable-Product Rule
The two general approaches to the deduction of post-extraction costs are the
at-the-well rule and the marketable-product rule.   While Texas, and perhaps38
a few other jurisdictions, have adopted the at-the-well rule,  more states have39
recently adopted some variation of the marketable-product rule.  40
Additionally, Michigan, Nevada, and Wyoming have adopted a statutory
version of the marketable-product rule,  and the United States has long41
followed this approach by statute and regulation.   Under both rules, the lessee42
Oil Co., 894 P.2d 788 (Kan. 1995); Mittelstaedt v. Santa Fe Minerals, Inc., 1998 OK 7, 954
P.2d 1203; Heritage Res., Inc. v. NationsBank, 939 S.W.2d 118 (Tex. 1996).
33. KUNTZ, supra note 1, § 40.5.
34. See Mittelstaedt, ¶ 2, 954 P.2d at 1205; Heritage Res., 939 S.W.2d at 122.
35. See KUNTZ, supra note 1, § 39.4 (processing used to describe various post-production
operations); id. § 40.4 (processing used to describe extraction of substances from gas); id. §
40.5(b) (discussing processing of wet gas as the removal of NGLs).
36. See LOWE ET AL., supra note 17, at 263-70; 3 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 11, §§
645, 645.1; see also Mittelstaedt, 1998 OK 7, 954 P.2d 1203; Heritage Res., 939 S.W.2d 118. 
37. See Rogers, 29 P.3d 887; Sternberger, 894 P.2d 788; Mittelstaedt, 1998 OK 7, 954 P.2d
1203; Estate of Tawney v. Columbia Natural Res., L.L.C., 633 S.E.2d 22 (W. Va. 2006).
38. See Anderson, supra note 6, at 338; Marshall, supra note 6, at 235.
39. See Wall v. United Gas Pub. Serv. Co., 152 So. 561, 564 (La. 1934); Creson v. Amoco
Prod. Co., 10 P.3d 853, 856 (N.M. Ct. App. 2000); Heritage Res., 939 S.W.2d 118.
40. See Rogers, 29 P.3d 887; Sternberger, 894 P.2d 788; Mittelstaedt, 1998 OK 7, 954 P.2d
1203; Tawney, 633 S.E.2d 22.
41. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 324.61503(b) (West 1999); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §
522.115(b) (West 2000); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 30-5-304 (2007).
42. See Federal Oil and Gas Royalty Management Act of 1982, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1758
(2000); see also 30 C.F.R. §§ 206.102, 206.103, 206.152-.154 (2007). 
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is responsible for all costs of exploration and production.   This is because the43
lessee, as the working interest owner, assumes the risk involved in developing
the lease, including all costs incurred in the production of oil or gas from the
leased premises.   Conversely, the lessor is not responsible for any costs44
incurred in production.  The lessor bears only the indirect risk that no oil or
gas will be found or, if found, that the lessee will not abide by the express or
implied terms of the lease.   The two approaches disagree, however, on what45
costs the lessee is required to bear after extraction of the oil or gas from the
wellhead.  Pursuant to the at-the-well rule, the lessee may deduct all costs
incurred after the oil or gas is severed from the wellhead.   In contrast, the46
marketable-product rule mandates that the lessee bear all costs incurred in
obtaining a marketable product and disallows the deduction of post-extraction
costs until a marketable product is obtained.   Under either rule, the actual47
presence or absence of “at the well” terminology in the royalty clause does not
seem to matter.48
1. The Marketable-Product Rule
Two bases for the marketable-product exist.  The first, which has been
relied on in most of the marketable-product states, is based on the implied
covenant to market.   Although all major oil and gas producing states49
recognize the implied covenant to market, there is disagreement among the
states as to what the covenant encompasses.   The implied covenant to market50
obligates a lessee to diligently seek a market for the oil or gas produced and,
if royalty is due on the price received, to obtain the best price reasonably
obtainable.   The basic premise underlying the implied covenant to market is51
43. Owen L. Anderson, Calculating Royalty: “Costs” Subsequent to Production—“Figures
Don’t Lie, but . . . .”, 33 WASHBURN L.J. 591, 591 (1994). 
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. See Martin v. Glass, 571 F. Supp. 1406, 1411-12 (N.D. Tex. 1983), aff’d, 736 F.2d
1524 (5th Cir. 1984); see also Heritage Res., Inc. v. NationsBank, 939 S.W.2d 118, 122 (Tex.
1996).
47. See Rogers v. Westerman Farm Co., 29 P.3d 887, 901 (Colo. 2001); Sternberger v.
Marathon Oil Co., 894 P.2d 788, 795 (Kan. 1995); Mittelstaedt v. Santa Fe Minerals, Inc., 1998
OK 7, ¶ 2, 954 P.2d 1203, 1205; Estate of Tawney v. Columbia Natural Res., L.L.C., 633
S.E.2d 22, 27-28 (W. Va. 2006). 
48. See, e.g., Martin, 571 F. Supp. at 1412 (reading “at the well” language into the lease);
Tawney, 633 S.E.2d 22 (ignoring the “at the well” language).
49. See Rogers, 29 P.3d 887; Sternberger, 894 P.2d 788; Mittelstaedt, 1998 OK 7, 954 P.2d
1203; Tawney, 633 S.E.2d 22.
50. See Martin, 571 F. Supp. 1406; Rogers, 29 P.3d 887; Sternberger, 894 P.2d 788;
Mittelstaedt, 1998 OK 7, 954 P.2d 1203; Tawney, 633 S.E.2d 22. 
51. Mittelstaedt, ¶ 2, 954 P.2d at 1211 (Opala, J., dissenting); see also Keeling & Gillespie,
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol60/iss4/4
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to ensure that both lessee and lessor benefit from the lease relationship.   The52
lessor’s primary benefit in entering an oil and gas lease is to receive a royalty
in exchange for leasing his mineral interest to the lessee.   Thus, the implied53
covenant to market protects the lessor’s benefit by obligating the lessee to
market its oil or gas production.   In states adhering to the marketable-product54
rule, the lessee’s duty to market, pursuant to the implied covenant, includes the
duty of preparing the product for market.   55
The late Professor Merrill asserted: 
If it is the lessee’s obligation to market the product, it seems
necessarily to follow that his is the task also to prepare it for
market, if it is unmerchantable in its natural form.  No part of the
costs of marketing or of preparation for sale is chargeable to the
lessor.56
Therefore, according to Professor Merrill, the implied covenant to market
obligates a lessee to bear all costs incurred in obtaining a marketable product.  57
Accordingly, states adhering to the marketable-product rule have found that
a lessee is obligated, pursuant to the implied covenant to market, to bear all
costs incurred in transforming the oil or gas into a marketable product.   As58
a result, royalty valuation occurs at the point where the product becomes
marketable, and post-extraction costs are not deductible until this point.  59
Additionally, some marketable-product states have extended the lessee’s duty,
pursuant to the implied covenant, to require the lessee to bear the costs of
transporting the product to market.   Thus, a lack of consensus among the60
marketable-product jurisdictions exists regarding the lessee’s duties and what
costs the lessee is obligated to bear.
Contractual interpretation is the second basis for the marketable-product
rule.  Rather than base his assertion on the implied covenant to market, the late
Professor Kuntz asserted that the express language of the typical oil and gas
lease should be interpreted as requiring the lessee to bear all costs incurred in
supra note 10, at 21. 
52. Keeling & Gillespie, supra note 10, at 21-23. 
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See Rogers, 29 P.3d 887; Sternberger, 894 P.2d 788; Mittelstaedt, 1998 OK 7, 954 P.2d
1203; Tawney, 633 S.E.2d 22.
56. MAURICE H. MERRILL, COVENANTS IMPLIED IN OIL AND GAS LEASES § 85, at 214-15




60. See Rogers, 29 P.3d at 900-01; Tawney, 633 S.E.2d at 22.
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obtaining a marketable product.   Under Kuntz’s view, “production,” as that61
term is used in an oil and gas lease, is not complete until a marketable product
is obtained.   Thus, the lessee is responsible for all costs incurred in obtaining62
a marketable product.  
Under either Merrill’s approach or Kuntz’s approach, once a marketable
product is obtained, post-extraction costs incurred to further enhance the
product are deductible.   Although the two bases for the marketable-product63
rule vary as to the reason the lessee is required to bear all costs incurred in
obtaining a marketable product, both views essentially produce the same
result.  Under either basis for the marketable-product rule, a lessee may not
deduct any costs incurred after extraction of oil or gas from the well head that
are necessary to create a marketable product.  Furthermore, under the views of
both Merrill and Kuntz, if there is no market for the product on the leased
premises, the lessee may deduct from a lessor’s royalty payment costs incurred
in transporting the marketable product to a distant point of sale.   Most states64
adhering to the marketable-product rule have reached the conclusion that the
lessee must obtain a marketable product based on the implied covenant to
market, rather than on Kuntz’s rule of contract construction.   However, two65
courts have reached their conclusion by citing Kuntz instead of Merrill.66
2. The At-the-Well Rule
The at-the-well rule is based on a property law approach to royalty
valuation, entitling the lessor to claim the royalty when the oil or gas is
captured at the wellhead and converted from real property to personal
property.   At-the-well jurisdictions recognize the implied covenant to market,67
however, in these jurisdictions the lessee’s only obligation under the covenant
is to diligently market production and obtain the best possible terms and
price.   As a result, under the at-the-well rule, a lessee’s duty to market does68
not require that the lessee bear all costs of preparing the product for market.  69
Courts embracing the at-the-well rule place little or no importance on the
61. KUNTZ, supra note 1, § 40.5; see also Lansdown, supra note 1, at 681.
62. KUNTZ, supra note 1, § 42.2; see also Lansdown, supra note 1, at 681.
63. KUNTZ, supra note 1, § 42.2; MERRILL, supra note 56, § 86.
64. KUNTZ, supra note 1, § 42.2; MERRILL, supra note 56, § 86.
65. See Rogers, 29 P.3d 887; Sternberger v. Marathon Oil Co., 894 P.2d 788 (Kan. 1995);
Mittelstaedt v. Santa Fe Minerals, Inc., 1998 OK 7, 954 P.2d 1203; Tawney, 633 S.E.2d 22.
66. See Rogers, 29 P.3d 887; Mittelstaedt, 1998 OK 7, 954 P.2d 1203.
67. Owen L. Anderson, Royalty Valuation: Should Royalty Obligations Be Determined
Intrinsically, Theoretically, or Realistically? (pt. 1), 37 NAT. RESOURCES J. 547, 572 (1997). 




condition of the product upon extraction.   Instead of evaluating the quality70
of the product, these courts use the point at which the product was severed
from the wellhead as the place for valuing the royalty.   Accordingly, all costs71
incurred after severance of the oil or gas from the wellhead are post-production
costs that can be proportionately deducted from a lessor’s royalty.72
3. The Sufficiency of “At the Well” Terminology in Allocating Post-
Extraction Costs
The default approach followed by a jurisdiction affects how the “at the
well” phrase in a gas royalty clause is construed.  Under the at-the-well rule,
as applied in Texas, courts construe the “at the well” phrase and similar
terminology as allocating all post-extraction costs at the point of severance
regardless of the marketability of the gas at that point and, generally,
regardless of other language in the royalty clauses that may suggest that some
post-extraction costs cannot be deducted.   The Texas Supreme Court has73
even allowed the “at the well” phrase to trump an express no-deductions
clause, declaring the clause surplusage as a matter of law and permitting the
deduction of all post-extraction costs.   Therefore, all costs incurred after74
severance are considered post-production costs and may be deducted from a
lessor’s royalty.   Furthermore, even if a royalty clause does not contain the75
“at the well” phrase or similar terminology, Texas courts have implied the “at
the well” phrase in oil and gas leases.   76
Jurisdictions that adhere to a version of the marketable-product rule
generally find that the “at the well” phrase is insufficient to allocate post-
extraction costs and hold that royalty valuation should occur at the point the
product becomes marketable.   The basic premise upon which these77
jurisdictions operate is that, absent language to the contrary, the lessee is
70. See Piney Woods Country Life Sch. v. Shell Oil Co., 726 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1984);
Martin v. Glass, 571 F. Supp. 1406, 1415 (N.D. Tex. 1983), aff’d, 736 F.2d 1524 (5th Cir.
1984); Schroeder v. Terra Energy, Ltd., 565 N.W.2d 887, 893 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997); Creson
v. Amoco Prod. Co., 10 P.3d 853 (N.M. App. 2000).
71. Id. 
72. Id.; see also Poitevent, supra note 10, at 720.  
73. Martin, 571 F. Supp. at 1412; see also Heritage Res., Inc. v. NationsBank, 939 S.W.2d
118, 121 (Tex. 1996).
74. Heritage Res., 939 S.W.2d 118.
75. Martin, 571 F. Supp. at 1412. 
76. Id.
77. Rogers v. Westerman Farm Co., 29 P.3d 887 (Colo. 2001); Sternberger v. Marathon
Oil Co., 894 P.2d 788 (Kan. 1995); Mittelstaedt v. Santa Fe Minerals, Inc., 1998 OK 7, 954
P.2d 1203.
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responsible for all costs incurred in making a product marketable.   The78
marketable-product jurisdictions have found the “at the well” phrase
insufficient to allocate post-extraction costs either because the court found the
lease’s language silent with respect to the allocation of costs or because the
court found the language ambiguous.   Additionally, in some cases, courts79
simply ignore the “at the well” phrase.   Although the “at the well” phrase has80
been found insufficient to allocate all post-extraction costs in all marketable-
product jurisdictions, a few states may find that it sufficiently provides the
location of royalty valuation.   Thus, in these jurisdictions, when royalty is to81
be valued “at the well,” the lessee may be allowed to deduct reasonable
transportation costs. 
In marketable-product jurisdictions, once a court determines that the lease
language fails to allocate post-extraction costs to a lessor, the courts have then
resolved the case based upon the implied covenant to market to determine
whether any post-extraction costs may be deducted from a lessor’s royalty
payment.   Pursuant to the implied covenant to market, the lessee is82
responsible for all costs incurred to make the product marketable.  83
Accordingly, the lessee completes her duty when a marketable product is
obtained, and royalty valuation should occur at this point.   In addressing the84
issue of when a product is marketable, the jurisdictions that adhere to the
marketable-product rule do not agree on the details.   85
4. Two Methods of “Deducting” Post-Extraction Costs
Once the royalty valuation point is ascertained, one of two methods is used
to take into account post-valuation-point costs where the sale is downstream
of the valuation point.   These methods are used in both at-the-well and86
marketable-product states.   The first—and traditionally preferable—method87
78. See Garman v. Conoco, Inc. 886 P.2d 652, 661 (Colo. 1994). 
79. See Rogers, 29 P.3d 887; Estate of Tawney v. Columbia Natural Res., L.L.C., 633
S.E.2d 22 (W. Va. 2006). 
80. See Hanna Oil & Gas Co. v. Taylor, 759 S.W.2d 563 (Ark. 1988); Mittelstaedt, 1998
OK 7, 954 P.2d 1203.
81. See Sternberger, 894 P.2d 788.
82. See Rogers, 29 P.3d 887; Mittelstaedt, 1998 OK 7, 954 P.2d 1203; Tawney, 633 S.E.2d
22. 
83. Rogers, 29 P.3d 887; Mittelstaedt, 1998 OK 7, 954 P.2d 1203; Tawney, 633 S.E.2d 22.
84. See Rogers, 29 P.3d 887; Mittelstaedt, 1998 OK 7, 954 P.2d 1203; Tawney, 633 S.E.2d
22.
85. See Rogers, 29 P.3d 887; Sternberger, 894 P.2d 788; Mittelstaedt, 1998 OK 7, 954 P.2d
1203; Tawney, 633 S.E.2d 22.
86. Kramer, supra note 28, at 244-45.
87. See Martin v. Glass, 574 F. Supp. 1406 (N.D. Tex. 1983), aff’d, 736 F.2d 1524 (5th Cir.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol60/iss4/4
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is comparable sales.   Pursuant to this approach, post-extraction costs are not88
actually deducted from the lessor’s royalty.   Rather, the courts look for89
comparable sales at the same or similar valuation point of gas of a similar
quality to determine the value of the gas at issue.   For example, if the royalty-90
valuation point is at the well, comparable sales of gas at the well are used to
determine the price on which royalty is paid.  The comparable-sales method
is frequently unworkable, however, because there o`ften are no comparable
sales at the same or similar valuation point—especially in an at-the-well
jurisdiction.91
Under the second method, the work-back approach, post-valuation costs are
deducted from the proceeds or value at the actual point of sale, depending on
other language in the lease.   For example, costs incurred to transport a92
product to a distant market beyond the royalty-valuation point will be deducted
from either the proceeds or market value at the point of sale to determine the
value on which royalty is due.
In two jurisdictions, Oklahoma and Colorado, royalty is due on the greater
of the comparable sales or work-back approach.   And the lessee appears to93
bear the burden of this calculation.94
Royalty valuation remains a challenge because of the various jurisdictional
views regarding post-extraction costs.  This is especially true in states adhering
to the marketable-product rule because of disparity among these jurisdictions
regarding the precise allocation of post-extraction costs.   This lack of95
uniformity hinders the interpretation of lease language, the determination of
marketability, and the deduction of costs.  The lack of uniformity can also
result in a lessor being paid a significantly different amount for royalty





90. Id.; see also Kramer, supra note 28, at 244. 
91. Martin, 571 F. Supp. 1406; Kramer, supra note 28, at 246.
92. Kramer, supra note 28, at 246. 
93. See Garman v. Conoco, Inc., 886 P.2d 652, 661 (Colo. 1994); Mittelstaedt v. Santa Fe
Minerals, Inc., 1998 OK 7, ¶ 29, 954 P.2d 1203, 1210.
94. Garman, 886 P.2d at 661; Mittelstaedt, ¶ 2, 954 P.2d at 1204.
95. See infra Part III.
96. See infra Part IV.
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III. Marketable-Product Jurisdictions
To examine the differences in the courts’ treatment of post-extraction costs
pursuant to the marketable-product approach, five states’ variations of the
approach, and their supporting case law, are discussed.  Although some states
have adopted the marketable-product rule by statute,  these states are not97
discussed because, outside of Wyoming, case law interpreting the statutes is
lacking and because the focus of this article is how the courts without statutes
construe royalty clauses for valuation purposes.  The five states examined are
Arkansas, Kansas, Colorado, West Virginia, and Oklahoma.  In all five states,
royalty valuation should occur when a marketable product is obtained, and the
lessee is required to bear all costs incurred in obtaining a marketable product.  98
Thus, the deductibility of post-extraction costs hinges on whether a marketable
product has been obtained.  The five states, as exemplified by case law, have
reached somewhat different conclusions as to the point at which a product
becomes marketable.  Additionally, the five states vary as to whether
marketability is purely a question of fact or, in part, a question of law. 
A. Arkansas
The rule in Arkansas is not yet firmly established; however, two cases,
when taken together, suggest that Arkansas can be classified as a marketable-
product jurisdiction.  The two cases in which the Arkansas Supreme Court
addressed the deduction of post-extraction costs are Clear Creek Oil & Gas
Co. v Bushmiaer,  and Hanna Oil & Gas Co. v. Taylor.   At issue in Clear99 100
Creek was the amount of gas royalty due under a lease that provided for
royalty to be paid on the “market price of royalty gas at the well.”   When101
calculating royalty, the lessee in Clear Creek did not deduct specific post-
extraction costs.   Rather, the lessee paid royalty at the price other companies102
were paying for royalty on gas in the same field and at the wells.   The court103
held that, because there was no market for gas at the well, royalty should be
97. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 324.61503(b) (West 1999); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 522.115(b) (West 2000); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 30-5-304 (2007).
98. See Hanna Oil & Gas Co. v. Taylor, 759 S.W.2d 563 (Ark. 1988); Rogers v. Westerman
Farm Co., 29 P.3d 887 (Colo. 2001); Sternberger v. Marathon Oil Co., 894 P.2d 788 (Kan.
1995); Mittelstaedt, 1998 OK 7, ¶ 26, 954 P.2d 1203, 1209; Estate of Tawney v. Columbia
Natural Res., L.L.C., 633 S.E.2d 22 (W. Va. 2006).
99. 264 S.W. 830 (Ark. 1924).
100. 759 S.W.2d 563 (Ark. 1988).





determined at the “the nearest place where they have market value,” less
transportation costs.   Although the Clear Creek court addressed the point at104
which royalty should be calculated, not the deduction of post-extract costs, the
court’s holding indicates that deduction of post-extraction costs would not be
allowed.  
Six decades later, in Hanna Oil & Gas Co. v. Taylor, the Arkansas Supreme
Court had the opportunity to address the deduction of post-extraction costs,
specifically compression costs.   In Hanna, the Arkansas Supreme Court,105
without expressly stating it was doing so, applied the marketable-product
rule.   At issue in Hanna were deductions from the lessor’s royalty payments106
for compression costs.   The lease royalty provision provided that royalty107
was to be paid on “proceeds . . . at the well . . . .”   Compression was108
necessary to deliver the gas at the required pressure.   The Supreme Court of109
Arkansas concluded that under the royalty clause providing for royalty
payment based on proceeds at the well, the lessee could not deduct
compression costs.   The court reasoned that absent language allocating110
compression costs to the lessor, the term “proceeds” meant total proceeds.  111
The court also stated that the parties’ construction of the agreement supported
its conclusion, and the fact that the lessee waited two years before deducting
compression costs indicated the lessee’s construction was consistent with the
courts.112
The gas at issue in Hanna required compression to meet the requirements
of the purchaser.   Accordingly, the gas was not marketable until compressed,113
and by disallowing the deduction of compression costs from the lessor’s
royalty, the court required the lessee to bear all compression costs. 
Furthermore, the court stated that, if the lessee had intended to deduct
compression costs, he would have included language to that effect.   To reach114
this conclusion the court had to assume that the “at the well” phrase was
insufficient to allocate the costs of compression to the lessor.115
104. Id. at 832.
105. Hanna Oil & Gas Co. v. Taylor, 759 S.W.2d 563 (Ark. 1988).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 564.
108. Id.
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Thus, the court in Hanna held that, absent contract language allocating the
costs of compression, the lessee owing royalty under a “proceeds at the well”
royalty clause may not deduct compression costs from a lessor’s royalty
payment.   The court never stated that it was applying the marketable-product116
rule, nor did it mention the implied covenant to market; however, the court’s
holding is more consistent with the marketable-product rule than it is the at-
the-well rule.  The court in Hanna effectively required the lessee to bear the
costs incurred in obtaining a marketable product and also effectively found the
“at the well” phrase insufficient to allocate costs.  
 In his dissent in Hanna, Justice Hays’ discussion of the implied covenant
to market and the deduction of transportation costs inadvertently supports the
conclusion that the court was applying the marketable-product rule.   Justice117
Hays recognized that it could be argued that the lessee is required to bear costs
incurred to compress gas under the implied covenant to market.   However,118
he then noted that the court, in Clear Creek, rejected the idea that the lessee
was required to bear all transportation costs.   Justice Hays then equated119
compression costs with transportation costs, stating that they are both “post-
production” costs, and that he believed the court should follow Clear Creek,
thereby allowing the lessee to deduct compression costs from the lessor’s
royalty.   Justice Hays’ analysis concerning the implied covenant to market,120
however, is flawed.  Although compression and long-distance transportation
are both post-extraction costs, they are not one and the same.  Transportation
costs to a distant market, like the costs in Clear Creek, are deductible from a
lessor’s royalty payment under the traditional marketable-product rule.   This121
is because, unlike compression costs incurred to make the product marketable,
transportation costs are deductible when incurred to transport an already
marketable product.122
Justice Hays did point to one difference between the lease royalty clauses
in Clear Creek and Hanna.  While the lease provision in Clear Creek required
royalty to be paid on “market price,” the lease provision in Hanna called for
royalty to be paid on “proceeds.”   Justice Hays accurately stated that the123
difference is irrelevant because the issue in the case is not the basis for
calculating the royalty (market value or proceeds), but rather it is the issue of
116. Id.
117. Id. at 565-66 (Hays, J., dissenting).
118. Id.
119. Id. at 566.
120. Id.
121. See KUNTZ, supra note 1, § 40.5; Anderson, supra note 67, at 598. 
122. See KUNTZ, supra note 1, § 40.5.
123. Hanna, 759 S.W.2d at 564-65. 
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what expenses are deductible from the basis.   This assertion is accurate as124
well as consistent with the marketable-product rule.  As previously discussed,
royalty valuation is a two-step inquiry, the first step is to determine the amount
on which royalty is to be paid (market value or proceeds), and the next is to
determine what deductions may be taken.  Both Clear Creek and Hanna
address deductions, thus, for purposes of that inquiry, the fact that one royalty
provision provides for proceeds and the other market value is irrelevant.  
Thus, while Arkansas has yet to explicitly state that it requires the lessee to
bear all costs incurred in obtaining a marketable product, the Arkansas
Supreme Court’s holdings in both Clear Creek and Hanna lend significant
support to the conclusion that Arkansas is a marketable-product jurisdiction. 
Under Arkansas’ variation of the marketable-product rule, as applied in Clear
Creek and Hanna, compression costs incurred to meet the requirements of the
purchaser are not deductible, but costs incurred to transport compressed
marketable gas to a distant market are deductible.  In both cases, however, the
court failed to expressly address the “at the well” phrase present in the lease
royalty clauses.
The Arkansas Supreme Court appears to have implicitly adopted the
marketable-product rule by applying it without expressly saying so.  It remains
uncertain whether Arkansas’s variation of the marketable-product rule is based
on the implied covenant to market or on the contractual view that production
is not complete until a marketable product is obtained.  This issue will not be
resolved until the court further defines the basis for the rule, as well as
expressly stating that the marketable-product rule applies.  Nevertheless, as
previously stated, the result generally is the same under either view.
If the Arkansas courts continue to adhere to Clear Creek and Hanna, it
follows that costs incurred to enhance an already marketable product would be
deductible from a lessor’s royalty, including transportation costs to a distant
market.  Furthermore, it remains unclear whether marketability, pursuant to
Arkansas’s rule, will be treated as a question of fact or as a mixed question of
fact and law.  For example, might compression be deductible if uncompressed
gas is actually sold in the field in an otherwise comparable sale?  Or will
compression, as a matter of marketing custom and practice be deemed to be
nondeductible?  The court’s emphasis on the need to compress the gas to meet
required pressures suggests that the deductibility of compression may be a
question of fact.  In any event, the court seems disinclined to treat compression
as a component of transportation.
124. Id.
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2007
784 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  60:769
B. Kansas
Kansas first adopted the marketable-product rule in Gilmore v. Superior Oil
Co.   The lessee in Gilmore installed a compressor station to compress the125
gas for delivery into the purchaser’s pipeline on the leased premises.   The126
lessee then deducted costs for compression from the lessor’s royalty payment,
and the lessor alleged these deductions were improper.   The lease royalty127
clause in Gilmore required royalty to be paid on “proceeds . . . at the mouth of
the well . . . .”   The Kansas Supreme Court stated that prior to compression128
there was no market for the gas.   The purpose of the compression was “to129
put enough force behind the gas to enable it to enter the pipeline on the lease,”
and that this made the gas marketable.   The court then discussed the implied130
covenant to market and Professor Merrill’s views about the covenant.   The131
court concluded that, under the implied covenant to market, the lessee has the
duty to prepare the product for market.   Thus, the lessee is required to bear132
costs incurred in preparing the product for market because they are necessary
to make the gas marketable.   Accordingly, royalty is owed on the product133
when it becomes marketable.   The court then held that the lessee was not134
allowed to deduct compression costs because the costs were necessary to make
the gas marketable.   135
The rule in Gilmore was applied in Schupbach v. Continental Oil Co.,  a136
case with nearly identical facts.  At issue in Schupbach were deductions for
compression costs from a lessor’s royalty payment.   The lease royalty clause137
called for royalty to be paid on gross “proceeds . . . at the mouth of the
well.”   The Kansas Supreme Court concluded that the court’s decision in138
Gilmore was controlling.   Accordingly, the court held that the lessee was not139
entitled to deduct compression costs from the lessor’s royalty payment because
125. 388 P.2d 602 (Kan. 1964).
126. Id. 
127. Id. at 604.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 606.
130. Id.





136. 394 P.2d 1 (Kan. 1964).
137. Id. at 2.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 5.
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the costs were necessary to make the gas marketable.   The Kansas Supreme140
Court based its adoption of the marketable-product rule on Professor Merrill’s
view that the implied covenant to market obligates a lessee to prepare the
product for market.  
The court further defined its version of the marketable-product rule in
Sternberger v. Marathon Oil Co.   At issue in Sternberger were deductions141
from royalty and overriding royalty interests for costs labeled as “gathering
line amortization expenses.”   The deductions were taken to recover a portion142
of the expenses the operator incurred in constructing and maintaining gas
gathering systems to transport gas from the leased premises to pipeline
connections off the lease.   The gathering system was constructed because143
there was no market for gas at the wellhead.   The royalty clause in144
Sternberger called for royalty to be paid on “market price at the well.”   145
Regarding the issues of whether the deductions for gathering were
appropriate, the court turned to prior Kansas case law holding that “where
royalties are based on market price ‘at the well’ . . . the lessor must bear a
proportionate share of the expenses in transporting the gas or oil to a distant
market.”   The court also discussed Schupbach and Gilmore.   In these146 147
cases, lessees were not allowed to deduct costs for compression, on or off the
premises, because compression was necessary to make the gas marketable.  148
According to the court, “[t]he lessee has the duty to produce a marketable
product, and the lessee alone bears the expense in making the product
marketable.”149
Additionally, the court held that, even though the “at the well” phrase is
silent as to post-extraction costs, the language is nevertheless unambiguous
and provides the location point of valuation for royalty payments.   In other150
words, the “at the well” phrase does not address the condition of the product;
however, it does specify the location at which royalty is to be calculated, and
therefore transportation costs are deductible.  Thus, whether the deductions
from the lessors’ royalties were proper depended on whether the costs were for
140. Id. at 5-7.
141. 894 P.2d 788 (Kan. 1995).




146. Id. at 796.
147. Id. at 798 (citing Schupbach v. Cont’l Oil Co., 394 P.2d 1 (Kan. 1964); Gilmore v.
Superior Oil Co., 388 P.2d 602 (Kan. 1964)).
148. Schupbach, 394 P.2d 1; Gilmore, 388 P.2d 602.
149. Sternberger, 894 P.2d at 799.
150. Id. at 794-95. 
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transportation, or whether the costs were incurred in making the product
marketable and must be borne by the lessee alone.
The Sternberger court then determined that, other than the lack of a
purchaser at the well, there was no evidence that the gas produced was not
otherwise marketable at the well.   The court also determined that there was151
no evidence that any costs to condition the gas for marketing, such as
compression, processing, or dehydration, had been incurred or deducted.  152
The court found that although the gas was marketable at the well, there was no
market at the well, and that the pipeline was constructed to transport the gas
to a distant market.   Accordingly, the court held that the deductions were for153
transportation,  and that the costs incurred to transport the marketable gas to154
the point of sale were properly deducted from the lessors’ royalty.155
Thus, under Kansas law, the “at the well” phrase and similar terminology
provide the location at which the royalty is to be valued, but the lessee still has
a duty to obtain a marketable product and bear all costs incurred in
conditioning the gas for that purpose.   Therefore, under a “market price at156
the well” royalty clause, once a product is in a marketable condition and if
there is a market in the vicinity of the field,  the lessor is entitled to the157
product’s market price in the field even if the product is sold further
downstream.   If there is no market available at the well, however, the lessee158
may deduct costs incurred to transport the marketable product from the well
to the point of sale provided the lessee proves that the costs were reasonable.  159
Thus, royalty would be determined on the market price at the point of sale by
deducting the reasonable cost of transportation from the wellhead to the point
of sale (the work-back method).
If the royalty clause calls for payment of royalty on “proceeds at the well,”
the lessee may not deduct any costs incurred in obtaining a marketable
product.   The same analysis as “market value” clauses applies to “proceeds”160
clauses regarding transportation costs.   Further, under either a “proceeds”161






156. Id. at 801.
157. See id. at 795.
158. Id. at 795, 801.
159. Id. at 801.




to enhance the value of the marketable product may be deducted from a
lessor’s royalty payment if the lessee proves the costs were reasonable.162
Pursuant to Kansas’ version of the marketable-product rule, a marketable
product is obtained when the product is in a marketable condition.  In other
words, marketability depends on conditioning not on location.  Perhaps
inadvertently, the court seems to have reached the decision that gas is in a
marketable condition as a matter of law rather than as a matter of fact.  This
is evidenced by the court’s holding in Sternberger.  The court in Sternberger
indicated that the product was in a marketable condition at the well, but
because there was no market at the well it had to be transported to a distant
market.   Accordingly, the lessee was allowed to deduct transportation costs163
so that royalty reflected the value of the product when it became marketable
rather than after its value was enhanced because of transportation to a distant
market.   The court comes to this conclusion after distinguishing Sternberger164
from prior cases in which deductions for compression were disallowed because
compression is a marketing cost, and stating that there was evidence that the
gas was not marketable at the well.   Thus, the Kansas rule seems to treat165
marketability as a question of law by disallowing the deduction of
compression as a matter of law, but allowing the deduction of other gathering
costs.  In other words, rather than treat the deductibility of all post-extraction
costs as a factual inquiry into whether a marketable product has been obtained,
the Kansas rule seems to view compression as always necessary in obtaining
a marketable product and is thus not deductible.   Therefore, while166
transportation costs, including gathering, may be deductible, costs for
compression to move gas away from the well, which are arguably part of
transportation, are nevertheless not deductible as a matter of law.   It is167
possible, however, that compression costs incurred downstream of the lease to
move gas to a distant market could be considered transportation cost, and as
such would be deductible.
C. Colorado
The Colorado Supreme Court first applied the marketable-product rule in
Garman v. Conoco, Inc.   The court addressed the issue of whether a lessee168
is allowed to deduct post-extraction expenses from an overriding royalty






168. 886 P.2d 652 (Colo. 1994). 
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interest.   The defendant deducted certain post-extraction expenses, including169
processing, transportation, and compression costs, from the plaintiff’s
overriding royalty.   The plaintiffs argued that post-extraction charges should170
not have been deducted because post-extraction costs incurred in making the
gas marketable were the sole responsibility of the lessee.   In contrast, the171
defendant argued that all post-extraction costs incurred after severance at the
well should be allocated proportionately between royalty, overriding royalty,
and working interest owners because all expenses after severance improve or
enhance the value of the gas.172
In addressing the deductibility of post-extraction costs, the court first
concluded that the assignment creating the overriding royalty was silent
regarding the allocation of post-extraction costs.   The court came to this173
conclusion without considering the language of the assignment.   The court174
then stated that, regarding the allocation of post-extraction expenses, two lines
of cases had developed based on “when production is established and a royalty
interest accrues.”   One line of cases, stemming from Texas and Louisiana,175
follow the rule that nonoperating interests (royalty and overriding royalty
owners) must bear their proportionate share of costs that are incurred after gas
is severed at the wellhead.   The second line of cases, stemming from Kansas176
and Oklahoma, follow a contrary rule based on an operator’s implied covenant
to market gas.   Additionally, the court noted that Arkansas and North177
Dakota “have reached similar conclusions when considering lease royalty
clauses which are silent as to allocation of post-production costs.”178
169. Id. at 653.  “An overriding royalty is a percentage of the gross production payable to
some person other than the lessor or persons claiming under the lessor, and arises where an
owner of the working interest contracts to deliver a part of the gross production to another
person . . . .”  38 AM. JUR. 2D Gas and Oil § 215 (1999).
170. Garman, 886 P.2d at 653.
171. Id. at 655-59. 
172. Id. at 655-56.
173. Id. at 654.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 657.
176. Id. at 657-68 (citing Martin v. Glass, 571 F. Supp. 1406, 1415 (N.D. Tex. 1983)
(applying Texas law), aff’d, 736 F.2d 1524 (5th Cir. 1984); Merritt v. Sw. Elec. Power Co., 499
So. 2d 210 (La. Ct. App. 1986); Dancinger Oil & Refineries v. Hamill Drilling Co., 171 S.W.2d
321 (Tex. 1943)).
177. Id. at 659 (citing Gilmore v. Superior Oil Co., 388 P.2d 602, 606 (Kan. 1964); Wood
v. TXO Prod. Corp., 1992 OK 100, ¶ 9, 854 P.2d 880, 882).
178. Id. at 658 (citing Hanna Oil & Gas Co. v. Taylor, 759 S.W.2d 563, 565 (Ark. 1988);
West v. Alpar Res., Inc., 298 N.W.2d 484, 491 (N.D. 1980)).
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After discussing other jurisdictions’ approaches to the allocation of post-
extraction costs, the court examined the implied duty to market.   The court179
stated that “the implied covenant to market obligates the lessee to incur those
post-production costs necessary to place gas in a condition acceptable for
market” and that “[o]verriding royalty interest owners are not obligated to
share in these costs.”   Moreover, the court stated:180
Upon obtaining a marketable product, any additional costs incurred
to enhance the value of the marketable gas, such as those costs
conceded by the [plaintiffs], may be charged against nonworking
interests.  To the extent that certain processing costs enhance the
value of an already marketable product the burden should be placed
upon the lessee to show such costs are reasonable, and that actual
royalty revenues increase in proportion with the costs assessed
against the nonworking interest. . . . 
For the above reasons[,] . . . absent an assignment provision to
the contrary, overriding royalty interest owners are not obligated to
bear any share of post-production expenses, such as compressing,
transporting and processing, undertaken to transform raw gas
produced at the surface into a marketable product.181
Thus, the Garman court held that where the language in the lease is silent, the
implied covenant to market obligates the lessee to pay all post-extraction costs
incurred transforming the gas into a marketable form.   Additionally, if a182
lessee argues that costs were incurred to enhance the value of already
marketable gas, the lessee has the burden of proving the reasonableness of the
costs and that net royalty revenues were increased.   Applying the Colorado183
Supreme Court’s analysis in Garman, royalty valuation occurs at the point the
product becomes marketable.  Accordingly, the point of marketability is
significant in determining whether post-extraction costs can be allocated to
lessors.
In Rogers v. Westerman, the Colorado Supreme Court felt the need to define
the term “marketable product.”   In Rogers, the court addressed the184
sufficiency of the “at the well” phrase in allocating costs, the implied covenant
to market, and the definition of marketability.   The lessors brought suit185
179. Id. at 658-60.
180. Id. at 659.
181. Id. at 661 (footnote omitted).
182. Id. at 659.
183. Id. at 661. 
184. Rogers v. Westerman, 29 P.3d 887 (Colo. 2001).
185. Id. at 891, 896. 
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alleging royalty underpayment because of deductions from the lessors’ royalty
for gathering, dehydration, and compression.   There were four types of186
leases at issue and the leases provided for royalty to be paid on either the
“market value” or the “proceeds” from the sale of gas “at the well” or “at the
mouth of the well.”   The court stated that the gas at the wells was sold187
“sweet and dry” as it emerged from the well.   The gas that was sold away188
from the wells was first gathered to move the gas to the main line and then
compressed and dehydrated to meet the interstate pipeline specifications.  189
Royalties for gas sold away from the wells were based on the price of the gas
sold with deductions for the costs of gathering, compression, and
dehydration.190
The Colorado Supreme Court began its analysis by addressing the “at the
well” and “at the mouth of the well” phrases in the lease royalty clauses.  191
The court found that the “at the well” phrases in the four types of leases in
dispute in Rogers were subject to more than one interpretation.  192
Nevertheless, the court stated that these phrases were silent as to the allocation
of post-extraction costs because they failed to adequately describe the
calculation and allocation of cost between the parties.   The court stated that193
contract language should be construed as a whole and specific phrases should
not be interpreted in isolation.   The court, however, disregarded its own rule194
of construction by stating that “this language in isolation is actually silent with
respect to those costs.”   The court continued to contradict its own rule by195
viewing the rest of the lease language in isolation, and concluding that no light
is shed on how, or whether, the allocation of costs was intended to be
addressed by this phrase.196
The court also discussed other courts’ interpretations of “at the well”
terminology, criticizing both courts that have held that the “at the well” phrase
speaks to both quality and location, as well as courts that have held that the “at
the well” phrase speaks only to the location for royalty valuation.   The court197
also emphasized the rule that “oil and gas leases are strictly construed against
186. Id. at 891.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 892.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 893-94.
191. Id. at 896.
192. Id. at 896-97.
193. Id. at 894-96.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 898.
196. Id. 
197. Id. at 898-902.
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the lessee in favor of the lessor.”   Thus, the court held that “at the well”198
terminology is silent and speaks to neither quality nor location.   Next, the199
court stated that because the lease language was silent regarding the allocation
of costs, the implied covenant to market controls the determination of whether
the deductions were improper.200
The Rogers court began its discussion of the implied covenant to market by
examining its prior holding in Garman that “the implied covenant to market
obligates the lessee to incur those post-production costs necessary to place gas
in a condition acceptable for market.”   The court stated that this covenant201
relieves royalty owners from responsibility for any costs incurred to obtain a
marketable product.   In other words, the deduction of post-extraction costs202
also depends on the location where the product becomes marketable, and the
lessee must bear all costs incurred to that point.  Additionally, costs incurred
after obtaining a marketable product that enhance the value of the product, or
relate to the product’s transportation to another location, may be allocated
between the lessee and lessor if certain conditions are met.203
The court in Rogers stated that its ruling in Garman was limited because,
although it held that all costs incurred in placing gas in a marketable product
were to be borne by the lessee alone, it failed to define marketable product.  204
The court then defined a marketable product stating that “marketability”
includes “both a reference to the physical condition of the gas, as well as the
ability for the gas to be sold in a commercial marketplace.”   To guide its205
definition of marketable product, the court examined the marketable-product
rule but declined to adopt the rule in its entirety.   The marketable-rule206
provides, “the point where a marketable product is first obtained is the logical
point where the exploration and production segment of the oil and gas industry
ends, is the point where the primary objective of the lease contract is achieved,
and therefore is the logical point for the calculation of royalty.”   Thus, the207
point at which a first-marketable product is obtained is the point at which
royalty calculations should be made.   The marketable-product rule, however,208
198. Id. at 901.
199. Id. at 902-03.
200. Id. at 902.
201. Id. (quoting Garman v. Conoco, Inc., 886 P.2d 652, 659 (Colo. 1994)).
202. Id. (citing Garman, 886 P.2d at 659).
203. Id. 
204. Id. at 896.
205. Id. at 903.
206. Id. at 904. 
207. Id. (quoting Anderson, supra note 2, at 637).  
208. Id.
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does not place the extra burden on the lessee of requiring him to bear all costs
incurred in transporting the marketable product to a market location.209
After refusing to adopt the marketable-product rule in its entirety, the
Rogers court greatly extended the lessees’ duty under its version of the implied
covenant to market when it held: 
Gas is marketable when it is in the physical condition such that it
is acceptable to bought and sold in a commercial marketplace, and
in the location of a commercial marketplace, such that it is
commercially saleable in the oil and gas marketplace.  The
determination of whether gas is marketable is a question of fact, to
be resolved by a fact finder.210
Accordingly, gas may be found to reach first-marketable product status either
upon its severance from the wellhead, if the gas is in a marketable condition
at the wellhead and if a commercial market for the product exists at the
wellhead, or upon its suitability and entry into a market pipeline.  Thus, in
Colorado, pursuant to the implied covenant to market, the lessee must bear all
expenses incurred to obtain a “marketable product,” with the definition of
“marketable” including both a marketable-condition requirement and a market-
location requirement.   Consequently, according to the Colorado Supreme211
Court’s definition of marketable product, all costs incurred to transport gas to
a market location are to be borne solely by the lessee.212
The court greatly extended the lessee’s duty to market by requiring that the
lessee bear all costs incurred in transporting a product to a market location. 
Although the transportation charges at issue in Rogers were for gathering, the
court did not limit the rule to gathering costs.  The lack of a limitation on
transportation costs implies that costs incurred to transport gas to a distant
marketplace would be the responsibility of the lessee alone if its first market
was at a distant location.  After the product becomes marketable and is at a
market location, additional costs to improve or transport the product are
allocated proportionately between the lessee and the lessor as long as they are
reasonable.  These costs, however, are proportionately allocated only if they
are incurred after the product is both in a marketable condition and at a market
location and if the value downstream benefits the royalty owner.
The Colorado Court of Appeals applied the Rogers holding in Savage v.
Williams Production RMT Co.   In Savage, a mineral owner sued a lessee to213
209. See Anderson, supra note 2, at 640.  
210. Rogers, 29 P.3d at 906.
211. Id. at 904.  
212. Id. at 906.
213. 140 P.3d 67 (Colo. Ct. App. 2005). 
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recover unpaid royalties allegedly resulting from improper deduction of costs
incurred in gathering, processing, and transporting gas.   The Colorado Court214
of Appeals upheld the trial court’s decision that deductions for processing
costs and transportation from the mineral owner’s royalty were improper.  215
The appellate court reached this conclusion after finding that the royalty clause
language that provided for royalty to be paid on “one-eighth of the proceeds”
was silent as to the allocation of costs.   The court did not state what costs216
were included in the term processing costs.  Courts are often vague when using
the term, and even though processing is the extraction of NGLs, courts often
use the term when referring to treating, dehydration, and compression.  217
Thus, it remains unclear what these costs were actually for.
In Savage, the court compared the royalty-clause language in the lease at
issue to the language of one of the leases in Rogers.  The court concluded that
the lease language did not describe where the royalties were to be calculated
or address the allocation of costs between the parties.   After concluding that218
the leases were silent with respect to the allocation of costs, the court upheld
the trial court’s application of the marketability analysis.   The Savage court219
stated that the Rogers court determined that marketability analysis applies
“[a]bsent express lease provisions addressing [the] allocation of costs.”   The220
court stated that, when determining whether gas is marketable, two factors—
condition and location—must be considered.   The court then stated that221
marketable condition depends on “whether it is in the physical condition where
it is acceptable to be bought and sold in a commercial marketplace,”  and that222
market location means a “commercial marketplace” defined as “the region in
which any commodity or product can be sold; the geographical or economic
extent of the commercial demand.”223
The court of appeals then examined the trial court’s application of the
marketability analysis.   The trial court had determined that, because the gas224
had to be processed and transported to the pipeline before it could be sold, it
was not marketable at the wellhead.   The lessee had contended that this was225
214. Id. at 69.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
218. Savage, 140 P.3d at 70.  
219. Id. (quoting Rogers v. Westerman Farm Co., 29 P.3d 887, 906 (Colo. 2001)). 
220. Id. (quoting Rogers, 29 P.3d at 906) (alterations in original).
221. Id.
222. Id. (quoting Rogers, 29 P.3d at 905) (internal quotation marks omitted).
223. Id. (quoting Rogers, 29 P.3d at 905).
224. Id. at 71.
225. Id. 
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an erroneous conclusion because a company had offered to purchase gas
produced at the wellhead in 1984, and therefore, it was marketable at the
well.   The appellate court, however, upheld the trial court’s statement that226
the gas was not marketable, recognizing that “[g]as is not marketable merely
because it is sold.”   Furthermore, the appellate court stated that although a227
“single purchaser . . . is evidence that there is a market for the gas,” a single
purchaser does not conclusively establish a market.   Thus, the offer to228
purchase the gas at the wellhead provided one consideration in determining
whether a commercial market for the gas existed.   Additionally, the court229
stated that the determination of marketability is a question of fact and will not
be disturbed unless clearly erroneous.   The appellate court stated that “there230
was sufficient evidence in the record from which the trial court could have
determined that there was almost no commercial market for the gas . . . .”  231
After examining the marketability analysis, the court of appeals upheld the
trial court’s conclusion that the gas was marketable only after processing and
transportation to the interstate pipeline.232
Ultimately, Savage exemplifies application of the rule articulated in Rogers. 
In Savage, the court continued to find lease language silent with respect to the
allocation of costs, and applied the Rogers definition of “marketability,”
requiring that the product be both in a marketable condition and at a market
location.  Thus, under the Colorado rule, royalty valuation occurs at the point
at which a marketable product is obtained and is at a market location. 
Furthermore, the “at the well” phrase, and similar terminology, is insufficient
to allocate post-extraction costs and does not provide the location for royalty
valuation.  Accordingly, all costs incurred in creating a product in marketable
condition and transporting that product to a market location are to be borne by
the lessee alone and may not be deducted from a lessor’s royalty or an
overriding royalty.  As stated in Rogers, Colorado treats all post-extraction
costs, including transportation, in the same manner;  whereas Kansas,233 234
Oklahoma,  and perhaps Arkansas  differentiate between transportation235 236
costs and other costs such as dehydration and compression.  
226. Id.
227. Id. (quoting Rogers, 29 P.3d at 910) (alteration in original).
228. Id. (quoting Rogers, 29 P.3d at 910) (omission in original).
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 72.
232. Id.
233. See generally Rogers, 29 P.3d 887.
234. See supra Part III.B.
235. See infra Part III.E.
236. See supra Part III.A.
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This extension of the marketable-product rule places a large burden on the
lessee by requiring the lessee to bear all costs incurred in transporting the
product to a market location.  The lessee is potentially responsible for
substantial costs if the product must be transported to an initial distant market. 
As stated in both Rogers and Savage, however, once a product is marketable,
any costs incurred to further enhance the product are shared by the lessor and
lessee if such costs are reasonable and if the net result benefits the lessor.  237
Therefore, if the lessee decides to carry an already marketable product further
downstream to enhance its value, then the lessee may deduct these costs from
the lessor’s royalty subject to the limitation just stated.  Additionally, under the
Colorado rule, the determination of marketability is a question of fact.238
D. West Virginia
Thus far, three states’ variations of the marketable-product rule have been
examined, and with each, the lessee’s duty to market the product and the costs
the lessee is required to bear have increased.  This trend continues in the
discussion of West Virginia’s approach to the allocation of post-extraction
costs.  West Virginia appears to prohibit any deductions of post-extraction
costs and requires lessees to bear all costs incurred until the point of sale.
Just four days after the Rogers decision, the West Virginia Supreme Court
addressed the deduction of post-extraction costs in Wellman v. Energy
Resources, Inc.   The leases at issue contained provisions requiring the239
royalty payment for gas to be based on “proceeds . . . at the mouth of the
well . . . .”   The lessees paid royalties after deducting certain expenses,240
which were unidentified by the court.   These deductions resulted in the241
payment of royalties on the basis of $0.87 per thousand cubic feet, rather then
the proceeds received by the lessees of $2.22 per thousand cubic feet.   The242
lessor’s brought suit alleging that royalties were improperly paid because of
the deduction of these expenses.243
In examining the appropriateness of the royalty payments, the court stated
that “there has been an attempt on the part of oil and gas producers in recent
years to charge the landowner with a pro rata share of various expenses . . .
such as the expense of transporting oil and gas to a point of sale, and the
expense of treating or altering the oil and gas so as to put it in a marketable
237. Rogers, 29 P.3d at 906; Savage, 140 P.3d at 69.
238. Rogers, 29 P.3d at 905.
239. 557 S.E.2d 254 (W. Va. 2001).
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condition.”   The court continued this discussion, stating that the expenses244
have been referred to as “post-production” expenses “to escape the rule that
the lessee must pay the costs of discovery and production.”   The court then245
stated that although some states have taken this approach, others have rejected
it when the lease calls for royalties to be based on proceeds under the rationale
of the duty to market.246
After examining the case law in Colorado, Kansas, and Oklahoma, the court
stated that West Virginia also recognizes the implied covenant to market and
the lessee’s duty to bear all costs incurred to fulfill this duty.   Accordingly,247
the court held that the “lessee should bear the costs associated with marketing
products produced under a lease.”   Marketing the product includes bearing248
those costs necessary to prepare the product for market.  Additionally, the
court stated that “if an oil and gas lease provides for a royalty based on
proceeds received by the lessee, unless the lease provides otherwise, the lessee
must bear all costs incurred in exploring for, producing, marketing, and
transporting the product to the point of sale . . . .”   The lessee may only249
deduct post-extraction costs if the lease provides that “the lessor shall bear
some part of the costs incurred between the wellhead and the point of
sale . . . .”   The lessee must also prove “by evidence of the type normally250
developed in legal proceedings requiring an accounting, that he, the lessee,
actually incurred such costs and that they were reasonable.”   The court251
stated that the “proceeds” and “at the mouth of the well” language indicated
the parties intended for the lessors to bear part of the transportation costs.  252
Nonetheless, the court held that because there was no evidence that the costs
were actually incurred or reasonable, the trial court’s award of damages was
proper.253
The court in Wellman, like the court in Rogers, greatly expanded the
covenant to market by increasing the lessee’s duty to bear costs.  The court in
Wellman, however, did not state that the “at the well” phrase was silent. 
Instead, the Wellman court indicated that transportation costs could be
deducted if there was evidence that the lessee actually incurred the costs and
244. Id. at 264.
245. Id.
246. Id.









if they were reasonable.  The West Virginia Supreme Court, however,
dispelled the notion that transportation costs could be deducted in Estate of
Tawney v. Columbia Natural Resources, L.L.C.  254
In Tawney, the West Virginia Supreme Court further expanded the lessee’s
duty pursuant to the implied covenant to market.   In Tawney, lessors filed255
a class-action lawsuit alleging insufficient royalty payments against a lessee.  256
The lessee had deducted from the lessors’ royalty interest “post-production
costs,” including the “delivery of gas from the well to the Columbia Gas
Transmission (‘TCO’) point of delivery, processing of the gas to make it
satisfactory for delivery into TCO’s transportation line, and losses of volume
of gas due to leaks in the gathering system or other volume loss . . . .”   The257
court framed the issue presented in Tawney as “whether the ‘at the wellhead’-
type language at issue is sufficient to alter [the court’s] generally recognized
rule that the lessee must bear all costs of marketing and transporting the
product to the point of sale.”   258
The leases in dispute in Tawney contained language in the royalty clauses
indicating that the royalty payment was to be calculated in one of four ways:
“at the well,” “at the wellhead,” “net all costs beyond the wellhead,” or “less
all taxes, assessments, and adjustments.”   In interpreting this language, the259
West Virginia Supreme Court examined the two predominate methods for
allocating post-extraction costs, but the court explicitly rejected both
approaches.   Instead, the court examined West Virginia’s settled law and260
stated that, in West Virginia, a landowner has traditionally received royalty
payments “based on the sale price of the gas received by the lessee.”  261
Next, the West Virginia Supreme Court found all the “at the well” phrases
in the leases’ royalty clauses insufficient to allocate post-extraction costs
because of their ambiguity.   The court defined ambiguity as “language262
reasonably susceptible of two different meanings or language of such doubtful
meaning that reasonable minds might be uncertain or disagree as to its
meaning.”   Applying this definition, the court held that the “at the well”263
terminology was ambiguous because it lacked definiteness by failing to
254. 633 S.E.2d 22 (W. Va. 2006).
255. Id.
256. Id. at 25.
257. Id. 
258. Id. at 28.
259. Id. at 25.
260. Id. at 27.
261. Id. 
262. Id. 
263. Id. at 28 (quoting Payne v. Weston, 466 S.E.2d 161, 166 (1995)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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indicate how or by what method the royalty is to be calculated or the gas
valued.   Further, the court stated that general language is inadequate to264
indicate the parties’ intent to implement a rule contrary to West Virginia’s
traditional rule that lessors receive royalty payments based on the sale price of
the gas without deductions for transporting and processing the gas.   The265
court also rejected the lessee’s argument that “when read with accompanying
language such as ‘gross proceeds,’ ‘market price,’ and ‘net of all costs,’ the
wellhead-type language clearly calls for allocation of post-production
expenses.”   The court stated that the phrase “gross proceeds at the wellhead”266
could create an inherent conflict because gas is usually not sold at the wellhead
and therefore the lessee usually does not receive proceeds at the wellhead.  267
Additionally, “market price at the wellhead” is “unclear since it contemplates
the actual sale of gas at the physical location of the wellhead, although the gas
generally is not sold at the wellhead.”   Thus, the court concluded that these268
phrases were ambiguous regarding the allocation of post-extraction costs. 
After concluding that the four variations of the “at the wellhead” phrase in
the leases were ambiguous, the court then construed the language against the
lessee.   The court stated that if the lessee intended “the lessors to bear a269
portion of the transportation and processing costs of oil and gas, [the lessee]
could have written into the leases specific language which clearly informed the
lessors exactly how their royalties were to be calculated and what deductions
were to be taken from the royalty amounts . . . .”   Accordingly, the court270
held that 
language in an oil and gas lease that is intended to allocate between
the lessor and lessee the costs of marketing the product and
transporting it to the point of sale must expressly provide that the
lessor shall bear some part of the costs incurred between the
wellhead and the point of sale, identify with particularity the
specific deductions the lessee intends to take from the lessor’s
royalty . . . and indicate the method of calculating the amount to be
deducted from the royalty for such post-production costs.271
264. Id. 
265. Id. 
266. Id. at 28-29.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 29.
269. Id. (quoting Charlton v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 174 S.E. 570 (W. Va. 1934)).
270. Id. at 29-30.
271. Id. at 30.
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Furthermore, the “at the well” phrase in a lease royalty clause is ambiguous,
and it “is not effective to permit the lessee to deduct from the lessor’s one-
eighth royalty any portion of the costs incurred between the wellhead and the
point of sale.”   Thus, the court dispelled any previous notion under Wellman272
that transportation costs could be deducted under a “proceeds at the well” type
lease.
Therefore, under the court’s decision in Tawney, all costs incurred up to the
point of sale must be borne by the lessee alone.  Additionally, the “at the well”
phrase is ambiguous and, thus, insufficient to allocate post-extraction costs to
a lessor’s royalty payment.  While the holding in Wellman was limited to a
“proceeds at the well” lease, the Tawney court’s conclusion that “market price
at the wellhead” is ambiguous regarding the allocation of post-extraction costs
indicates that the Tawney rule also applies to “market price” or “market value”
leases.   The court failed to recognize that a product could be in a marketable273
condition prior to the point of sale and extended no exceptions for
transportation costs or costs incurred to enhance an already marketable
product.  Rather, the court simply found that all costs are to be borne by the
lessee up to the point of sale unless the lease language provides otherwise. 
Thus, in West Virginia, like Colorado, the “at the well” phrase provides
neither the condition nor the location of royalty valuation.  
This extension of the implied covenant to market seemingly surpasses
Colorado’s extension of the covenant in Rogers.  Under Rogers, once a
product is marketable, the court allowed the deduction of additional costs
incurred to improve or transport the product as long as they were reasonable.  274
In contrast, the rule announced in Tawney makes no such exceptions for costs
incurred after a product is marketable.  Rather, Tawney seems to equate
marketability with the point of sale.  Accordingly, the West Virginia rule
requires royalty valuation to occur at the point at which a marketable product
is obtained, however, a marketable product is not obtained under the rule until
it is sold.   Thus, royalty is owed on value added to the product by275
transportation and any other enhancements to the product, even if the product
was marketable at a point before it was sold.  
The West Virginia Supreme Court based its rule on the implied covenant to
market; however, the court’s indication that production is not complete until
a marketable product is obtained is indicative of the contractual view
advocated for by the late Professor Kuntz.  Thus, the court seemingly
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Rogers v. Westerman Farm Co., 29 P.3d 887, 906 (Colo. 2001).  
275. Tawney, 633 S.E.2d at 29.
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combined the implied covenant basis and the contractual basis for the
marketable-product rule.  The Colorado Supreme Court, in Rogers, also cited
Kuntz’s contractual view yet found that a lessee is required to obtain a
marketable product pursuant to the implied covenant.   Regardless of the276
basis for the rule, the West Virginia Supreme Court held that the lessee is
required to obtain a marketable product and equated a marketable product with
the point of sale.  Furthermore, marketability in West Virginia appears to be
a rule of law that is based upon the fact of sale—presumably a sale at arms
length, and no inquiry is made into the condition of the product at or prior to
the point of sale. 
E. Oklahoma’s Treatment of Post-extraction Costs
After examining Arkansas, Kansas, Colorado, and West Virginia’s rules
regarding “at the well” terminology and the allocation of post-extraction costs,
the question remains as to where the Oklahoma rule lies.  The answer is
probably somewhere between Kansas and Colorado.  For now, Arkansas,
Kansas, Oklahoma, Colorado, and West Virginia represent the order in which
a lessee’s duty to bear costs increases; however, Arkansas case law is rather
thin.  Arkansas could move further along this continuum in the future.  Like
all of the other states’ variation of the marketable-product rule, the Oklahoma
rule requires the lessee to bear all costs incurred to obtain a marketable
product.   The Oklahoma rule, however, differs from the other rules in its277
treatment of the “at the well” phrase and post-extraction costs incurred to
enhance an already marketable product. 
1. Oklahoma Case Law
Unlike Arkansas and Kansas, Oklahoma has an extensive history of case
law in which it has applied the marketable-product rule.  Johnson v. Jernigan
was one of the earliest decisions in which the Oklahoma Supreme Court
addressed the deductibility of post-extraction costs.   At issue in Johnson278
were deductions from a lessor’s royalty payment for transportation costs
incurred to transport gas to the nearest market.   The royalty clause in the279
lease called for royalty to be paid on the “gross proceeds at the prevailing
market rate.”   The Oklahoma Supreme Court stated that 280
276. Rogers, 29 P.3d at 903.
277. Mittelstaedt v. Santa Fe Minerals, Inc., 1998 OK 7, ¶¶ 20-22, 954 P.2d 1203, 1208
(quoting TXO Prod. Corp. v. State ex rel. Comm’rs of the Land Office, 1994 OK 131, ¶ 17, 903
P.2d 258, 263).
278. Johnson v. Jernigan, 1970 OK 180, 475 P.2d 396.
279. Id. ¶ 1, 475 P.2d at 397.
280. Id. ¶ 4, 475 P.2d at 398.
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[m]arket rate means the rate at which the gas is commonly sold in
the vicinity of the well.  It is the market rate at the wellhead or in
the field that determines the sale price, and not the market rate at
the purchaser’s location which may be some distance away from
the lease premises.281
Thus, the court held that the lessee’s deductions from the lessor’s royalty for
a proportionate share of transportation costs were appropriate because no
market for the gas existed at the leased premises.   The court stated that the282
lessee’s duty to market did not include a duty to bear the full burden of
delivering the product to an off-site purchaser.   Additionally, the court283
distinguished Johnson from the prior case of Clark v. Slick Oil Co.,  in which284
deductions were not allowed.  Clark was the first case in which the court
applied the marketable-product rule.   The court distinguished Johnson from285
Clark by stating that the deductions at issue in Clark were for costs incurred
in preparing and caring for the oil, and not the costs of transporting the oil
away from the leased premises.286
Although the Oklahoma Supreme Court allowed for transportation costs to
be deducted from a lessor’s royalty in Johnson, the court disallowed the
deduction of compression costs in Wood v. TXO Production Corp.   The287
court came to this conclusion after finding that compression costs were
necessary to obtain a marketable product.288
At issue in Wood were deductions from the lessor’s royalty for costs
incurred to compress the gas to the required pressure for entry into the
purchaser’s pipelines on the leased premises.   The lease royalty clause289
provided that royalty would be paid on “the market price at the well . . . .”  290
The court stated that, absent an agreement that the lessor and lessee would
share costs of compression, the lessee could not deduct the cost of
compression from the lessor’s royalty payment.   This statement, when291
combined with the failure of the court to address the “at the well” phrase in the
royalty clause, supports the conclusion that the “at the well” phrase was
281. Id. ¶ 5, 475 P.2d at 398.
282. Id. ¶¶ 14-15, 475 P.2d at 399.
283. Id. 
284. 1922 OK 137, 211 P. 496. 
285. Id.
286. Johnson, ¶ 17, 475 P.2d at 400.
287. 1992 OK 100, 854 P.2d 880.
288. Id. ¶ 9, 854 P.2d at 882.
289. Id. ¶ 2, 854 P.2d at 880-81. 
290. Id. ¶ 1, 854 P.2d at 880.
291. Id. ¶ 11, 854 P.2d at 882-83.
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insufficient to allocate costs.  Furthermore, the court stated that “in Oklahoma
the lessee’s duty to market involves obtaining a marketable product,” and this
duty includes bearing the costs, such as compression costs, of preparing the
gas for market.292
The court addressed the lessee’s argument that the compression in this case
was equivalent to transportation because the compression was only “pushing”
the gas into the purchaser’s pipeline and was not compression to extract the
gas from the wellhead.   The court rejected the lessee’s contention, and293
stated: “We have not yet held that the lessor is required to bear any costs of
transportation where the point of sale is on the leased premises.”   The court294
stated that, unlike Johnson, there was no sale at a distant market and thus no
need to transport the product to the place of sale.   The court, however, did295
not conclusively state whether compression costs could ever be considered
transportation costs.
In TXO Production Corp. v. State ex rel. Commissioners of the Land
Office,  the Oklahoma Supreme Court addressed the deduction of296
compression, dehydration, and gathering costs from a lessor’s royalty.   The297
royalty clause in the lease at issue gave the lessor the option of receiving the
royalty share “in kind” “without costs into pipelines” or to be paid “in cash”
“the market value thereof.”   The lessor elected to receive the royalty in cash,298
and the lessee, before paying royalty to the lessor, deducted the costs of
compression, dehydration, and gathering that took place on the leased
premises.   The court held that the compression, dehydration, and gathering299
costs were necessary to prepare the product for the pipeline.  Thus, the court
concluded that, under the implied covenant to market and under the language
of the royalty clause, the lessee alone was required to bear all costs incurred
to make the product marketable.   Accordingly, the court held that the costs300
of compression, dehydration, and gathering on the leased premises could not
be deducted from the lessor’s royalty payment.301
After Johnson, Wood, and TXO, Oklahoma required that the lessee bear all
costs required to obtain a marketable product, but permitted the costs incurred
292. Id. ¶ 12, 854 P.2d at 883.
293. Id. ¶ 6, 854 P.2d at 881.
294. Id.
295. Id. ¶ 9, 854 P.2d at 882.
296. 1994 OK 131, 903 P.2d 259. 
297. Id.
298. Id. ¶ 4, 903 P.2d at 260 (emphasis omitted).
299. Id. ¶ 5, 903 P.2d at 260.
300. Id. ¶ 8, 903 P.2d at 261.
301. Id. ¶ 17, 903 P.2d at 263.
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in transporting the product off the leased premises to be proportionately
charged to a lessor.  The Oklahoma Supreme Court modified this rule in
Mittelstaedt v. Santa Fe Minerals, Inc.   At issue in Mittelstaedt were302
deductions from the lessor’s royalty for the costs of transportation,
dehydration, compression, and blending.   The lease royalty clauses called303
for royalty to be paid on “gross proceeds[] at the mouth of the well.”   The304
Mittelstaedt court stated that the term “gross proceeds” suggested that the
payment to the lessor was to be made without deductions and that a lease
requiring payment of the “market value” referenced the contract price of the
gas.   The court noted that, generally, costs are classified as either production305
costs, which are never allocated, or post-production costs.   The court stated306
that post-production costs may or may not be allocated based on the nature of
the cost and their relation to the duties of the lessee created by the express
language of the lease, the implied covenants, and industry custom.307
Although the “at the well” phrase was present in the royalty clause,  the308
court did not address the sufficiency of the phrase in allocating post-extraction
costs.  Rather, the court completely ignored the language.   The court held309
that, under the implied covenant to market, a lessee is required to transport the
product in marketable form to the place of sale on the leased premises and that
costs incurred to create a marketable product may not be allocated to the
lessor’s royalty.   Costs are incurred to obtain a marketable product if the310
costs are necessary to prepare the product for market.   Additionally, the311
court stated that costs incurred off the leased premises “must be examined on
an individual basis to determine if they are within the class of costs shared by
a royalty interest.”   The determination of whether the costs incurred off the312
leased premises fall within the lessee’s duty to market is based on an
examination of the language of the leases and custom and usage in the
industry.313
302. 1998 OK 7, 954 P.2d 1203. 
303. Id. ¶ 1, 954 P.2d at 1204-05.
304. Id. ¶ 11, 954 P.2d at 1206.
305. Id. ¶ 9, 954 P.2d at 1206 (citing Helmerich & Payne, Inc. v. State ex rel. Comm’rs of
the Land Office, 1997 OK 30, ¶ 12, 935 P.2d 1179, 1181; Pioneer Tel. Coop. Inc. v. Okla. Tax
Comm’n, 1992 OK 77, 832 P.2d 848).
306. Id. ¶ 26, 954 P.2d at 1209.
307. Id.
308. Id. ¶ 11, 954 P.2d 1206. 
309. Id. 
310. Id. ¶¶ 11-20, 954 P.2d at 1206-08.
311. Id. ¶ 12, 954 P.2d at 1206.
312. Id. ¶ 19, 954 P.2d at 1208.
313. Id. ¶ 26, 954 P.2d at 1209.
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Rather than finding that post-extraction costs are never allocable to a
lessor’s royalty, the court held:
[A] royalty interest may bear post-production costs of transporting,
blending, compression, and dehydration, when the costs are
reasonable, when actual royalty revenues increase in proportion to
the costs assessed against the royalty interest, when the costs are
associated with transforming an already marketable product into an
enhanced product, and when the lessee meets its burden of showing
these facts.314
In other words, the court held the lessee responsible for all costs incurred in
making the product marketable, but permitted the proportional allocation of
costs incurred after obtaining a marketable product upon the lessee’s
satisfaction of the stated requirements.  If the lessee chooses to take a
marketable product further downstream, however, the lessee must pay royalty
on the greater amount of either the proceeds of the sale, less the post-extraction
costs that enhance an already marketable product, or on the value of the
product in its first marketable-condition.  This is similar to the analysis applied
by the Oklahoma Supreme Court to affiliate sales.  According to Howell v.
Texaco Inc., when a lessee sells gas to an affiliate, the lessee must pay royalty
on the greater of the work-back calculation, based on the price the affiliate
receives on resale of the gas less allowable deductions, or on the prevailing
arm’s-length price of marketable gas determined by comparable sales when the
gas is sold to the affiliate.  315
According to the court’s holding in Mittelstaedt, royalty valuation occurs
when a marketable product is obtained and the lessee must bear all costs
incurred in obtaining a marketable product.  Therefore, no post-extraction
costs may be deducted from a lessor’s royalty payment until a marketable
product is obtained.  Once a product is in marketable form, a lessee may
deduct post-extraction costs if the lessee proves that the costs were incurred to
enhance an already marketable product, were reasonable, and that resulting
royalty revenues increased in proportion with the costs assessed against the
royalty interest.   Under this analysis, the court concluded that the post-316
extraction costs at issue were necessary to make the product marketable.  317
Thus, the costs were not deductible from the lessor’s royalty, and the lessee
was required to bear the cost.318
314. Id. ¶ 30, 954 P.2d at 1210.
315. Howell v. Texaco Inc., 2004 OK 92, 112 P.3d 1154.
316. Mittelstaedt, 1998 OK 7, 954 P.2d at 1208-09.




Although the court’s holding is seemingly at odds with the ruling in
Johnson, the court stated that its previous ruling in Johnson remains viable.  319
This is because the court stated that its holding in Mittelstaedt does not require
that the lessee bear all costs incurred in transporting gas in marketable
condition to a distant market when there is no market available at the
wellhead.   To the extent that Johnson is still good law, the court has yet to320
clarify when it will actually apply.  It is possible that when the court refers to
transportation costs it is distinguishing off-lease gathering from off-lease
pipeline transportation, with only the latter being deductible.
Although the Oklahoma courts have consistently held that costs incurred to
obtain a marketable product are not allocable to a lessor’s royalty interest, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court dramatically diverged from this rule regarding
overriding royalty in XAE Corp. v. SMR Property Management Co.   At issue321
in XAE were deductions taken from an overriding royalty interest for
gathering, processing, and compression costs.   The overriding royalty was322
created by assignment rather than reserved in a lease.   The assignment323
provided for a share of production “free and clear of all costs and expenses
whatsoever . . . .”   The Oklahoma Supreme Court stated that the lessee’s324
duty to deliver gas in marketable form arises from the lessee’s implied duty in
an oil and gas lease to market the product.   The court held that the implied325
duty to market did not apply to an overriding royalty interest created by an
assignment absent language creating that obligation.   Therefore, the owner326
of the overriding royalty does not benefit from the implied covenants in an oil
and gas lease and the only obligation of the lessee is to deliver the gas in-kind
when extracted.   Thus, the Oklahoma Supreme Court adopted the at-the-well327
rule regarding an overriding royalty in XAE.  Consequently, the lessee may
deduct post-extraction costs against overriding royalties.328
In XAE, the Oklahoma Supreme Court rejected the Colorado Supreme
Court’s holding in Garman v. Conoco, Inc. that the implied covenant to market
extends to overriding royalty because nonworking interests have no control
over the marketing decisions of the lessee.   Thus, according to Garman, a329
319. Id. ¶ 13, 954 P.2d at 1207.
320. Id. 
321. 1998 OK 51, 968 P.2d 1201. 
322. Id.
323. Id. ¶ 1, 968 P.2d at 1202.
324. Id. ¶ 2, 968 P.2d at 1202.
325. Id. ¶ 32, 968 P.2d at 1208.
326. Id.
327. Id.
328. Id. ¶ 31, 968 P.2d at 1208.
329. Id. ¶¶ 18-22, 968 P.2d at 1205-06 (citing Garman v. Conoco, Inc., 886 P.2d 652 (Colo.
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lessee may not deduct post-extraction costs incurred in obtaining a marketable
product from a overriding royalty payment, presumably even if “at the well”
language is present in the royalty clause.   Pursuant to the Oklahoma330
Supreme Court’s holding in XAE, however, all costs incurred after severance
from the wellhead may be deducted from overriding royalty regardless of the
absence of “at the well” language in the assignment creating the interest.  331
The court reasoned that the lessee’s duty to bear costs incurred in obtaining a
marketable product pursuant to the implied covenant to market arises out of
the oil and gas lease and therefore is not applicable to an overriding royalty
that is carved out of the working interest and created by an assignment.332
2. Oklahoma Royalty Valuation
In Oklahoma, royalty valuation occurs when a marketable product is
obtained.  The Oklahoma rule requires that the lessee bear all costs incurred
in obtaining a marketable product pursuant to the implied covenant to market,
and a lessee cannot deduct post-extraction costs from a lessor’s royalty if the
costs were necessary to prepare the product for market.  Some of the language
in Oklahoma cases seems to treat marketability as a question of law rather than
of fact.   This is evidenced by the court’s holding in TXO that “the costs for333
compression, dehydration and gathering” were not deductible because “such
processes are necessary to make the product marketable,”  as well as the334
court’s conclusion in Wood that compression costs cannot be deducted from
a lessor’s royalty.   Both cases concluded that the costs were necessary to335
create a marketable product without citing to any factual findings in this
regard.  336
Further evidence that Oklahoma seems to treat marketability as a question
of law is the court’s statement in Mittelstaedt that “[c]learly, compression on
1994)).
330. Id. ¶ 21, 968 P.2d at 1206 (quoting Garman, 886 P.2d at 659).
331. Id. ¶ 31, 968 P.2d at 1208.
332. Id. ¶¶ 24-25, 968 P.2d at 1207.
333. Anderson, supra note 2, at 664-69. 
334. TXO Prod. Corp. v. State ex rel. Comm’rs of the Land Office, 1994 OK 131, ¶ 17, 903
P.2d 259, 263; see also Mittelstaedt v. Santa Fe Minerals, Inc., 1998 OK 7, ¶ 15, 954 P.2d 1203,
1213-14 (Opala, J., dissenting) (stating that TXO “err[s] in treating marketability as a question
of law rather than one of fact” (emphasis omitted)). 
335. Wood v. TXO Prod. Corp., 1992 OK 100, ¶ 9, 854 P.2d 880, 882; see also Mittelstaedt,
¶ 15, 954 P.2d at 1213-14 (Opala, J., dissenting) (stating that Wood “err[s] in treating
marketability as a question of law rather than one of fact” (emphasis omitted)); Anderson, supra
note 2, at 665 (explaining that Wood treated marketability as a question of law).
336. See TXO, 1994 OK 131, 903 P.2d 259; Wood, 1992 OK 100, 854 P.2d 880; see also
Anderson, supra note 2, at 665-66.
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the leased premises to push marketable gas into the purchaser’s pipelines is a
cost not allocated to the royalty interest.”   Again, the court seems to simply337
conclude that compression is never deductible as a matter of law because no
factual findings are cited.  The court in Mittelstaedt ultimately concluded that
the compression, dehydration, and blending costs at issue in the case were
necessary to obtain a marketable product without citing any factual findings
regarding the availability of a market for the product before the post-extraction
costs were incurred.   Thus, the Oklahoma rule does not base the338
deductibility of post-extraction costs on a factual inquiry into whether a
marketable product has been obtained.   Rather, the Oklahoma rule disallows339
the deduction of compression, dehydration, gathering, and blending costs
because the court appears to deem them as being necessary to obtain a
marketable product as a matter of law.   Notwithstanding its language, the340
Oklahoma Supreme Court may intend for marketability to be a question of
fact.  Whether a product is or is not in a marketable condition inherently seems
to be a question of fact.   Of course, even if the court later clarifies that341
marketability is a question of fact, the lessee will likely continue to carry the
burden of proof on this issue.342
The Oklahoma rule allows for reasonable post-extraction costs incurred to
enhance an already marketable product to be deducted from a lessor’s royalty
if the lessee proves that the proceeds of the sale of the enhanced gas, less the
deductions for costs incurred to enhance the gas, are greater than the value of
the product when it first became marketable as determined by comparable
sales.   In other words, if the lessee enhances an already marketable product,343
the lessee must compare the work-back value of the royalty with comparable
sales and pay royalty on the greater of the two amounts.  Moreover, the
Oklahoma rule allows for the deduction of transportation costs if there is no
market available on the leased premises and the costs are incurred to transport
already marketable gas to a distant market off of the leased premises.   It344
appears, however, that the court differentiates between off lease gathering and
337. Mittelstaedt, ¶ 29, 954 P.2d at 1210 (citing Wood, 1992 OK 100, 854 P.2d 880).
338. Mittelstaedt, ¶¶ 20-26, 954 P.2d at 1208-09.  
339. Id.; see also id. ¶ 15, 954 P.2d at 1213-14 (Opala, J., dissenting) (criticizing the court
for “arbitrarily declar[ing] certain costs as necessary to produce a marketable product” without
any factual inquiry).
340. Mittelstaedt, ¶ 29, 954 P.2d at 1210; TXO, ¶¶ 12-17, 903 P.2d at 262-63; Wood, ¶ 9, 854
P.2d at 882; see also Anderson, supra note 2, at 665-66.
341. See Mittelstaedt, ¶ 15, 954 P.2d at 1213-14 (Opala, J., dissenting).
342. See id. ¶ 30, 954 P.2d at 1210 (majority opinion) (holding that post-production costs
can be deducted from royalty “when the lessee meets its burden of showing” certain facts).
343. Id. ¶¶ 29-30, 954 P.2d at 1210.
344. Johnson v. Jernigan, 1970 OK 180, 475 P.2d 396.
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off lease pipeline transportation, with the latter being deductible as
transportation costs.   Additionally, the lessee cannot deduct costs to345
transport the product if the point of sale is on the leased premises.   If there346
is an available market on the leased premises, but the lessee sells the product
further downstream the lessee can possibly deduct transportation costs to a
distant market.   The lessee, however, must prove that the product was347
already in a marketable form, that the costs were reasonable, and that the
proceeds of the sale of the enhanced gas, less the deductions of reasonable
costs incurred to enhance the gas, are greater than the value of the product
when it first became marketable as determined by comparable sales.348
Furthermore, Oklahoma’s rule regarding overriding royalty interest diverges
drastically from Oklahoma’s rule regarding royalty interest.  Unlike Colorado
and perhaps other jurisdictions, Oklahoma applies a different rule to overriding
royalty than it does to lease royalty.   The Oklahoma rule disallows349
deductions from a lessor’s royalty of costs incurred in obtaining a marketable
product.   In contrast, a lessee may deduct all post-extraction costs from an350
overriding royalty payment.  Thus, the Oklahoma courts have consistently
applied the marketable-product rule to lease royalty interests, however,
regarding overriding royalty, the at-the-well rule applies.
IV. A Comparison of the Five States’ Rules and Their Inherent Problems
After examining Arkansas, Kansas, Oklahoma, Colorado, and West
Virginia’s case law, it is apparent that absent a lease provision to the contrary,
all five states require that the lessee—pursuant to the implied covenant to
market—obtain a marketable product and to bear all costs incurred in doing
so.  Accordingly, royalty valuation in all five states occurs at the point a
marketable product is obtained.  The five rules, however, vary as to the exact
point at which a marketable product is obtained.  Under the Arkansas, Kansas,
and Oklahoma rules, a marketable product is one that is in marketable
condition, although some components of transportation, such as compression
in Kansas, and compression and gathering in Oklahoma, are not deductible. 
On the other hand, the Colorado rule defines a marketable product as one that
is in a marketable condition as well as at a market location.  Further, the West
Virginia rule seems to equate marketability with the point of sale; thus, a
345. Wood, ¶¶ 6-9, 854 P.2d at 881-82.
346. Id.
347. Mittelstaedt, ¶ 29, 954 P.2d at 1210.
348. Id.
349. See XAE Corp. v. SMR Prop. Mgmt. Co., 1998 OK 51, 968 P.2d 1201.
350. Id. ¶ 32, 968 P.2d at 1208.
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product is not marketable until it is sold.  Because of the variations as to when
a marketable product is obtained, the deductibility of post-extraction costs
differs under each state’s rule.
Additionally, the requirements that the lessee must prove to deduct post-
extraction costs incurred after a marketable product is obtained varies from
state-to-state, although Colorado and Oklahoma are in basic agreement on this
matter.  Furthermore, the rules differ regarding the treatment of “at the well”
terminology, the lessee’s obligation to bear transportation costs, and the
treatment of marketability as either a question of law or fact.  In the following
section, the five states’ rules are compared and contrasted to highlight the
variations in the states’ application of the marketable-product rule.  In
addition, a few possible problems inherent in the rules are discussed.
A. Transportation Costs, “At the Well” Terminology, and Post-Extraction
Costs Incurred to Enhance an Already Marketable Product 
Three of the five marketable-product states may allow for the deduction of
some transportation costs incurred in transporting a marketable product to a
distant point of sale when no market is available on the leased premises. 
Although, the Arkansas, Kansas, and Oklahoma rules allow for the deduction
of these costs, Kansas is the only state that clearly ties the rule to the “at the
well” phrase in a lease royalty clause.  Pursuant to the Kansas rule, the “at the
well” phrase provides the location for royalty valuation, even though it is
insufficient to allocate all post-extraction costs to a lessor.351
Conversely, the Arkansas and Oklahoma Supreme Courts failed to
expressly discuss the “at the well” phrase present in the lease royalty clauses. 
The Arkansas and Oklahoma courts failure to address the “at the well” phrase
is not in keeping with the historical interpretation of royalty clauses according
to contract principles, concentrating on the lease language and the intent of the
parties.   Thus, while the courts came to the correct conclusion regarding the352
deductibility of transportation costs, both courts failure to discuss the “at the
well” phrase in the royalty clause leaves the effect of this terminology open to
consideration.  
Regarding costs incurred to enhance or transport an already marketable
product, Kansas and Oklahoma have reached different conclusions as to what
the lessee is required to prove.  Pursuant to the Kansas rule, a lessee may
deduct costs incurred to enhance a marketable product if the lessee proves that
351. Sternberger v. Marathon Oil Co., 894 P.2d 788, 799-801 (Kan. 1995).
352. Mittelstaedt, ¶ 18, 954 P.2d at 1215 (Opala, J., dissenting); Anderson, supra note 67,
at 572; Poitevent, supra note 10, at 758.
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the costs were reasonable.   Pursuant to the Oklahoma rule, a lessee may353
deduct costs incurred to enhance or transport an already marketable product
if the lessee proves that the product was already in a marketable form, if the
costs were reasonable, and if royalty revenues increase in proportion with the
costs assessed against the royalty.   What this likely means is that the lessee354
may deduct reasonable post-extraction costs incurred to enhance an already
marketable product if the lessee shows that the proceeds of sale of the
enhanced product, less the deductions for costs incurred to enhance the
product, are greater than the value of the product when it first became
marketable as determined by comparable sales.  If the proceeds less deductions
are not greater, then the lessee must pay royalty on the value of the product
when it first became marketable—as may be determined by comparable sales. 
Thus, regarding the deductibility of post-extraction costs incurred to transport
or enhance an already marketable product, the Oklahoma rule places
requirements on the lessee that are more stringent than the Kansas rule that
only requires the lessee to prove the costs are reasonable.
Both the Colorado rule and the West Virginia rule disallow deduction of
transportation costs incurred to transport a product to the first market
location—apparently without regard to distance.  This is because the Colorado
rule defines “marketable product” as including both the physical condition of
the gas and the availability of a commercial market.   Thus, the lessee is355
required to bear all costs incurred in conditioning the gas for market, as well
as transporting the gas to a market location.  On the other hand, the West
Virginia rule, announced in Tawney, seems to equate marketability with the
point of sale.   Accordingly, the product, in effect, is not marketable until the356
point of sale, and the lessee may not deduct any costs incurred in obtaining a
marketable product or transporting the product to the point of sale.  
Both the Colorado and West Virginia rules depart from the traditional rule,
and from the rule adhered to in Oklahoma, Kansas, and Arkansas, that costs
to transport the product to a distant market are distinguishable from other costs
incurred in preparing gas for market.   The Colorado and West Virginia rules357
353. Sternberger, 894 P.2d at 801.
354. Mittelstaedt, ¶ 30, 954 P.2d at 1210.
355. Rogers v. Westerman Farm Co., 29 P.3d 887, 904 (Colo. 2001) (quoting Garman v.
Conoco, Inc., 886 P.2d 652, 660 n.26 (Colo. 1994)).
356. Estate of Tawney v. Columbia Natural Res., L.L.C., 633 S.E.2d 22 (W. Va. 2006); see
also supra Part III.D.
357. Rogers, 29 P.3d 887 (holding transportation costs are not distinguishable under
Colorado law); Tawney, 633 S.E.2d 22 (holding transportation costs are not distinguishable
under West Virginia law).
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place a heavy burden on the lessee by requiring him to bear the costs of
transportation to a distant market.   358
Pursuant to either the Colorado or West Virginia rule, the “at the well”
phrase does not provide the location for royalty valuation.  The Colorado
Supreme Court came to this conclusion after finding the “at the well” phrase
“silent.”   The court’s conclusion is inconsistent with the contract principles359
historically applied to royalty clauses.   The court stated that the language360
was subject to more than one interpretation, but rather than finding that the
language was ambiguous and trying to ascertain the intent of the parties, the
court concluded that the “at the well” phrase was completely silent as to cost
allocation respecting both condition and location.  361
In Tawney, the West Virginia Supreme Court did not find the “at the well”
terminology silent.  Rather, the Tawney court concluded that the language did
not provide the location for royalty valuation after finding the language
ambiguous.   Before the West Virginia Supreme Court’s decision in Tawney,362
the court had stated in dicta in Wellman that the “at the well” phrase and
similar terminology was indicative of the parties’ intent to allocate
transportation costs.   The Wellman court also suggested that a lessee could363
possibly deduct post-extraction costs for transportation if the lessee proved that
they were actually incurred and reasonable.   However, the possibility of364
deducting transportation costs did not last long.  The rule laid down in Tawney
made it clear that no costs may be allocated to a lessor until the point of sale,
absent more specific lease language to the contrary.   Thus, under the West365
Virginia rule, like the Colorado rule, the “at the well” phrase provides neither
the condition nor the location of royalty valuation.  The West Virginia rule
however, is based on the language being ambiguous rather than silent like the
Colorado rule.  The Tawney court’s determination that the “at the well” phrase
was ambiguous,  and the Rogers court’s determination that the language is366
silent,  beg the question of what language is sufficient to deduct367
transportation costs.
358. See Marshall, supra note 6, at 258.  
359. Rogers, 29 P.3d at 897.
360. Anderson, supra note 67, at 549; see also Owen L. Anderson, Rogers, Wellman, and
the New Implied Marketplace Covenant, ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. FOUND. SPECIAL INST. ON
PRIVATE OIL & GAS ROYALTIES (2003). 
361. Rogers, 29 P.3d at 897.
362. Estate of Tawney v. Columbia Natural Res., L.L.C., 633 S.E.2d 22, 29 (W. Va. 2006). 
363. Wellman v. Energy Res., Inc., 557 S.E.2d 254, 264-65 (W. Va. 2001). 
364. Id.
365. Tawney, 633 S.E.2d at 29.
366. Id.
367. Rogers v. Westerman Farm Co., 29 P.3d at 887, 896 (Colo. 2001).
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The Colorado and West Virginia rules create an incentive for the lessee to
focus on avoiding transportation costs, perhaps to the detriment of both parties. 
In particular circumstances, lessees will be enticed to seek a market based on
the lowest possible cost to transport the product rather than a market with the
best purchase price.  Of course, this is contrary to the implied covenant to
market, which historically required the lessee to market the product and obtain
the best possible price and terms.   Moreover, the extension of the lessee’s368
duty encourages the creation of markets near or at the wellhead, regardless of
whether the location is the most efficient marketplace.   Although the rule,369
in theory, was intended to provide more certainty and uniformity in royalty
valuation—thus reducing disputes over post-extraction costs—the application
of the rule could potentially result in more litigation requiring a determination
of whether the lessee was complying with the implied covenant to market and
seeking to obtain the best possible price and terms.  Accordingly, requiring the
lessee to bear transportation costs may actually complicate, rather than
simplify, royalty valuation, by giving the lessee an incentive to avoid
transportation costs; consequently subjecting the courts to the task of
determining if lessees are acting in good faith in compliance with the implied
covenant to market. 
While both the Colorado and West Virginia rules disallow the deduction of
costs incurred to transport a product in a marketable condition to a distant
location where no market is available on the leased premises, the two rules
differ regarding costs incurred to enhance an already marketable product.  The
Colorado rule defines a marketable product as referring to both condition and
location.   Thus, a lessee is required to bear all costs incurred in obtaining a370
product in a marketable condition as well as transporting the product to a
market location.   However, after the product becomes marketable, costs371
incurred to enhance or transport the product may be deducted from the lessor’s
royalty payment so long as the lessee proves that they are reasonable and that
the lessor has benefited from the enhancement.   In contrast, the West372
Virginia rule requires that the lessee bear all costs incurred up to the point of
sale.   Thus, post-extraction costs are never deductible from a lessor’s royalty373
payment.   Accordingly, the West Virginia rule expands the implied covenant374
368. Anderson, supra note 67, at 572.
369. Marshall, supra note 6, at 254. 
370. Rogers, 29 P.3d at 904 (quoting Garman v. Conoco, Inc., 886 P.2d 652, 660 n.26 (Colo.
1994)).
371. Id. at 906.
372. Id.




to market even more than the Colorado rule.  This places an undue burden on
the lessee and diverges from the traditional rule by requiring the lessee to bear
all post-extraction costs, including transportation costs, regardless of the
condition of the product or the presence of a market.  
Although the West Virginia Supreme Court was attempting to put a more
stringent requirement on the lessee to bear costs and to protect the lessor from
improper deductions, the court did neither.  This is because the West Virginia
rule’s requirement that a lessee bear all costs incurred until the point of sale
may encourage producers to sell at or near the wellhead.   This is contrary to375
the implied covenant to market, which historically required the lessee to
diligently market the product and obtain the best possible price and terms.  376
The practice of selling at or near the wellhead at arm’s length would comply
with the West Virginia rule because the lessee would incur all costs up to the
point of sale.   This practice, however, could result in a lessee selling the gas377
inefficiently—perhaps even before the gas is actually in a marketable
condition, thus contradicting the rule’s purpose.  
Further, burdening the lessee with all costs incurred until the point of sale
could encourage lessees to sell to an affiliate at the wellhead to avoid paying
royalty on the proceeds for a product that has been enhanced by large
expenditures on the lessee’s behalf.  Although a lessee, pursuant to the West
Virginia rule, is required to bear all costs until the point of sale,  the lessee378
can possibly avoid paying royalty on the proceeds by selling the product,
possibly in an unmarketable condition, at the well in an arms-length
transaction or perhaps even to an affiliate.  Of course, West Virginia could,
and probably would, prevent this from occurring by adopting a rule similar to
the Oklahoma rule in Howell v. Texaco Inc.   Pursuant to Howell, when a379
lessee sells oil or gas to an affiliate, the lessee must pay royalty on the greater
of the work-back calculation, based on the resale price of the gas from the
affiliate, less any permissible deductions for the costs of processing, or on the
prevailing arm’s-length price of marketable gas determined by comparable
sales when the gas is sold to the affiliate.  380
B. Marketability as a Question of Fact or Law
In Kansas, Oklahoma, and West Virginia the determination of
marketability, in certain respects, appears to be treated as a question of law,
375. Marshall, supra note 6, at 254. 
376. Anderson, supra note 67, at 572.
377. Tawney, 633 S.E.2d at 29.
378. Id.
379. 2004 OK 92, 112 P.3d 1154.
380. Id. ¶¶ 18-22, 112 P.3d at 1159-60.
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not fact.   Instead of a factual inquiry into the market conditions relevant to381
the gas in question and the existence of a market for the product, courts in
these states seem to have declared certain costs necessary to obtain a
marketable product.   Pursuant to the Kansas rule, it seems that compression382
costs are necessary to obtain a marketable product, and as such are not
deductible from a lessor’s royalty.   The Oklahoma rule disallows the383
deduction of compression, dehydration, gathering, and blending costs because
the court has deemed the costs are necessary to obtain a marketable product.  384
The West Virginia rule disallows the deduction of all post-extraction costs to
the point of sale.   Thus, the Kansas, Oklahoma, and West Virginia rules385
arguably fail to base the determination of when a marketable product is
obtained on a factual inquiry into the existence of a market.  
The Colorado rule, however, properly treats marketability as a question of
fact rather than one of law.   The inquiry as to marketability pursuant to the386
Colorado rule is fact specific and turns solely on the market conditions
relevant to the product in question and the existence of a market for the
product.387
It remains unclear whether marketability is treated as a question of fact or
law under the Arkansas rule.  388
 Oklahoma, Kansas, and Arkansas would do well to treat the marketability
questions as fact questions, and this may well be their true intent.  The
determination of when a marketable product is obtained seems to be
necessarily a question of fact.  The courts probably intended to treat
marketability as a question of fact; however, the courts’ statements regarding
the marketability of gas seem to treat marketability as a matter of law.  Of
course, even if a question of fact, the lessee would appear to bear the burden
of proof—at least in Oklahoma.389
381. Anderson, supra note 2, at 664-69; see also Tawney, 633 S.E.2d at 29 (disallowing
deductions prior to the point of sale).
382. Anderson, supra note 2, at 664-69.
383. See Gilmore v. Superior Oil Co., 388 P.2d 602, 606 (Kan. 1964).
384. See TXO Prod. Corp. v. State ex rel. Comm’rs of the Land Office, 1994 OK 131, ¶ 17,
903 P.2d 259, 263.
385. Estate of Tawney v. Columbia Natural Res., L.L.C., 633 S.E.2d 22, 29 (W. Va. 2006).
386. Rogers v. Westerman Farm Co., 29 P.3d 887, 906-09 (Colo. 2001).
387. Id.
388. See Hanna Oil & Gas Co. v. Taylor, 759 S.W.2d 563 (Ark. 1988). 
389. Mittelstaedt v. Santa Fe Minerals, Inc., 1998 OK 7, ¶ 30, 954 P.2d 1203, 1210.
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C. Oklahoma’s Divergence from the Marketable-Product Rule Regarding
Overriding Royalty Interests
Although Oklahoma’s version of the marketable-product rule applies to
royalty interests, the at-the-well rule applies to overriding royalty interests.  390
Oklahoma differs in this respect from Colorado that treats lease royalty and
overriding royalty in the same manner.   Although the Colorado Supreme391
Court’s decision in Garman influenced the Oklahoma rule regarding the
deduction of post-extraction costs from lease royalty, the Oklahoma Supreme
Court rejected the Garman rule regarding overriding royalty, even though
Garman dealt with an overriding royalty.   The court declined to apply the392
implied covenant to market to an overriding royalty and expressly rejected the
Colorado Supreme Court’s application of this duty to overriding royalty.  393
The court reasoned that lessee’s duty to bear all costs incurred in obtaining a
marketable product, under the implied covenant to market, arises out of the oil
and gas lease and that a lessee has no such duty under an assignment creating
an overriding royalty interest.394
V. Conclusion
Royalty valuation disputes are a growing source of oil and gas litigation and
the allocation of post-extraction costs is often the central issue in these
disputes.  The rules regarding the allocation of post-extraction costs are state-
specific, and the states’ rules vary dramatically regarding the costs that a lessee
is allowed to deduct from a lessor’s royalty payment.  Furthermore, the
sufficiency of “at the well” terminology in oil and gas leases varies from state
to state.  As a result, careful drafting of lease language is imperative to prevent
or permit a lessee to deduct post-extraction costs from a lessor’s royalty.  This
task, however, is often difficult because it remains unclear in many states what
costs may be allocated to a lessor pursuant to a state’s default rule, and what
language is sufficient to allocate the costs that are otherwise not deductible
pursuant to a state’s default rule.  Further, the lack of uniformity among the
courts regarding post-extraction costs will continue to result in increased
litigation as lessees remain unsure of what costs they may deduct.
The marketable-product approach requires that the lessee bear all costs
incurred in obtaining a marketable product.  This rule, however, as specifically
390. See XAE Corp. v. SMR Prop. Mgmt. Co., 1998 OK 51, 968 P.2d 1201.
391. See Garman v. Conoco, Inc., 886 P.2d 652, 653 (Colo. 1994).
392. XAE, ¶¶ 18-22, 968 P.2d at 1205-06.
393. Id.
394. Id. ¶ 32, 968 P.2d at 1208.
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adopted and applied in Arkansas, Kansas, Colorado, Oklahoma, and West
Virginia is not a uniform one, and in Colorado and West Virginia, the rule, as
applied there, goes beyond what either Professor Merril or Professor Kuntz
envisioned insofar as requiring the lessee to deliver the gas to a market-
location free of cost to the lessor.  Furthermore, inconsistencies remain within
the marketable-product jurisdictions concerning the determination of when a
marketable product is obtained and what post-extraction costs, if any, may be
deducted.  Perhaps the Arkansas, Kansas, Colorado, Oklahoma, and West
Virginia rules represent an attempt by the courts to reduce disputes over post-
extraction costs by simply specifying certain types of activities, such as
compression, as a production cost, which is similar to what the Texas at-the-
well rule attempts to do by defining production as extraction.  However well-
intentioned, the five state variations of the marketable-product rule have
resulted in a lack of uniformity which will continue to result in litigation as
lessees remain unsure of what costs they may deduct.
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